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Résumé
Ce mémoire analyse les déterminants des transferts du gouvernement fédéral canadien
aux gouvernements provinciaux durant la période 1981-2001. Un estimateur à effets
fixes pour chacune des années sous étude a été utilisé pour capter les mouvements dans
la contrainte budgétaire fédérale. Les transferts per capita sont une fonction négative
linéaire de la capacité fiscale des gouvernements provinciaux, une fonction positive
linéaire du taux de chômage provincial, et une fonction négative linéaire du logarithme
de la population. Les transferts sont aussi une fonction positive du vote pour le Parti
Libéral. Toutefois ces quatre variables indépendantes sont fortement corrélées entre
elles. Les données ne supportent pas l’hypothèse, qu’en préparation pour des élections,
les parties au pouvoir transfèrent plus d’argent aux régions où la course est serrée. Les
données ne supportent pas non plus l’hypothèse que la surreprésentation politique
génère plus de transferts, du moins au niveau provincial.
Mots clés : transferts intergouvernementaux; achat de votes; politique Canadienne
Abstract
This thesis examines the determinants of Canadian Federal Government transfers to
provincial governments from 1981 until 2001. Year fixed effects were used to capture
shifts in the federal government’s budget constraint. Per capita transfers are a negative
linear function of per capita provincial govermnent tax receipts, a positive linear
function ofa province’s unemployment rate, and a negative linear function of provincial
log population. Federal transfers are also a positive function of the Liberal Party vote
share. However, all four controls are strongly correlated amongst themseÏves. There is
little evidence that federal transfers are used strategically in the run-up to an election to
purchase “swing” provinces. There is also little evidence to support the idea that
political per capita over-representation generates higher transfers once the population
size is controlled for, at least on the provincial level.
Key words: intergovernmental transfers; intergovernmental grants; vote purchasing;
Canadian politics
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Résumé
Ce mémoire analyse les déterminants des transferts du gouvernement fédéral canadien
aux gouvernements provinciaux durant la période 1981-2001. Un estimateur à effets
fixes pour chacune des années sous étude a été utilisé pour capter les mouvements dans
la contrainte budgétaire fédérale. Les transferts per capita sont une fonction linéaire
négative de la capacité fiscale des gouvernements provinciaux, une fonction linéaire
positive du taux de chômage provincial, et une fonction linéaire négative du logarithme
de la population. Les régions qui ont voté pour le gouvernement au pouvoir reçoivent
plus de transferts. Toutefois, ces transferts supplémentaires ne proviennent pas des
transferts principaux. Les données ne supportent pas l’hypothèse, qu’en préparation
pour des élections, les parties au pouvoir transfèrent plus d’argent aux régions où la
course est serrée. Les données ne supportent pas non plus l’hypothèse que la
surreprésentation politique génère plus de transferts, du moins au niveau provincial.
Mots clés transferts intergouvernementaux; achat de votes; politique canadienne
Abstract
This thesis examines the determinants of Canadian Federal Government transfers to
provincial governments from 1981 until 2001. Year fixed effects were used to capture
shifts in the federal government’ s budget constraint. Per capita transfers are a negative
linear function of per capita provincial government tax receipts, a positive linear
function ofa province’s unemployment rate, and a negative linear function of provincial
log population. Politically, regions that support the government in power receive more
transfers. These additional transfers are not distributed through the main transfer
mechanisms, however. There is little evidence that federal transfers are used
strategically in the run-up to an election to purchase “swing” provinces. There is also
little evidence to support the idea that political per capita over-representation generates
higher transfers once the population size is controlled for, at least on the provincial
level.
Key words: intergovernmental transfers; intergovernmental grants; vote purchasing;
Canadian politics
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11. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the deterrninants of Canadian federal government cash transfers to
provincial governments during the period 198 1-2001.
The primary objective is to estimate political influence in the transfer system,
controlling for normative considerations and using an estimator that correctly accounts
for institutional mechanisms in place. It has been pointed out, by Wallis (1996) for
example, that if federal politics drive the allocation of resources the case for the
centralization ofthe fiscal system is weakened.
This thesis also has a comparative objective: it was primarily motivated by a
comparative paper written by Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004). They present an
international comparison of the determinants of intergovernmental grants. Their paper
does not include the case of Canada, so this thesis will serve to add to the international
comparative literature. This paper will also serve to support the simple empirical model
they propose, although some important issues about estimation are brought up.
The choice of the estimation procedure is quite important. It must attempt to
capture the institutional rnechanisms in place. The transfer system’s major components
must be estimated without bias, their functional forms correctly expressed. Only this
way can political influence be detected.
Using a linear model, real per capita transfers are a negative function of
provincial government per capita fiscal capacity, a positive function of the provincial
unemployment rate, and a negative function of the log population. Ihis model, lias an
R-Square of 0.80.
I test four separate political models.
Two of these models are pitted directly against one another in an attempt to
describe strategic vote purchasing behaviour. The first is the “swing” model whereby in
the run-up to an eÏection the party in power will transfer monies to regions where there
are many swing voters. The second model of political behaviour, the “constituent”
model, suggests that parties in power will transfer monies to regions that support them.
I also test whether provincial level political over-representation generates more
transfers per capita, ah else being equal.
2finally, I use party vote shares to see if voting for any one of Canada’s major
parties generates additional per capita transfers.
The main political resuit is that the regions that voted for the party in power
received extra transfers.
This thesis is divided into tbree main chapters. Chapter 2 is a literature review.
It starts by explaining the pertinence of this exercise. Chapter 3 presents some basics on
Canada. I also discuss the transfer system and describe the two main transfers, the
Equalization transfer and healthcare transfers. This will lead to the development of an
estimation strategy that correctly accounts for the institutions in place. Chapter 4
presents the econometric resuits.
Chapter 5 concludes.
32. LITERATURE REVIEW
Relevance of the research question
The research topic is relevant considering the importance of federal transfers in the
Canadian national fiscal system.
first, consider the absolute magnitude of transfers. In 2000, direct (cash) grants
from the central government to the provinces were $30 billion’. This represents 15% of
the federal government’s budget. This is a non-negligible fraction of federal public
expenditures.
Second, consider the importance of transfers in provincial government budgets.
Transfers represent 30% or more of total provincial governrnent revenues for half of the
provinces during the period under study, as will be shown in the next chapter.
Third, consider the overali importance of provincial governments in the national
provision of public goods and services. Canadian provinces are responsible for
delivering key programs, most notably education and healthcare. In fiscal year 2000,
the federal government had expenditures of $200 billion. Combined, the ten provinces
and three territories spent together $230 billion. Provincial expenditures in healthcare,
education, and social security (in order of importance), totaled more than $150 billion.
Even taking into consideration local (municipal) government spending, provincial
governments account for almost 45% of total public expenditures in Canada.
finally, another characteristic of the transfer architecture in Canada is that
transfers ftow from the higher levels of government to the lower levels of government.
Here, one simple example will suffice. In 2001, the federal level transferred over
$7,300 million to the Ontario provincial government. The Ontario provincial
government, for its part, transferred $12,915 million to more local instances of
government. Yet the Ontario provincial government transferred only $52 million to the
federal government, and local govemments transferred a total of $1 million to the
government of Ontario.
Data sources are presented at the begiiming of Chapter 3.
4Overali, the point is that tax field occupation by certain levels of government
and the division of expenditure responsibilities between these same levels of
government are j ointly determined. Economic efficiency, cost-rninimization,
administrative feasibility, and appropriate revenue/expenditure matching may push the
collectionlspending equilibrium in different directions. In the Canadian case, it seems
as though the optimal fiscal arrangement is one where more central levels of
government occupy and administer the main (lucrative) tax fields only to redistribute,
through transfers, a portion of this money to more local instances of government. So
the transfer from the federal to the provincial governments is an important part of the
overall national fiscal system and certainly an important policy tool.
b conclude the discussion on the relevance of the research topic, I use the
words of Wallis (1996) who puts it quite well:
Intergovernmental grants have become a major part of the fiscal structure.
They exist for social and economic reasons that reflect the interests of the
electorate, for public finance reasons that reflect the benefits from
centralized collection of revenues and decentralized administration of
expenditures, as well as political reasons. Grants represent tangible
benefits that can be delivered by politicians. For all these reasons grants
will continue to be used for a long time, and their determinants will
reflect the complex interaction of economic, fiscal, and political forces.
Literature review
The review of the literature is organized as follows. I first present the resuits from Boex
and Martinez-Vazquez (2004), as their paper is the central piece of literature to which
this thesis responds. I will then discuss the main normative determinants, some of the
principle fiscal and economic determinants, as well as present the relevant political
determinants present in the literature. I will finally look at two specific papers that offer
alternative procedures in estimating political influence.
5Boex and Martinez- Vazquez (2004)
Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) state,
[...] The general empirical approach followed by the incidence studies in the
literature is basically identical. The empirical studies that analyze the
distribution of intergovermnental grants across subnational jurisdictions
generally consider that the per capita amount of grants received by some
local government i (PC GRANT) is determined by four factors, including
local expenditure needs (NEEDS), some measure of revenue capacity or
revenue effort (REVENUE), a variety of political factors (POLITICS),
and/or the relative population size of the jurisdiction (POP). This
relationship my be represented in linear form as:
PC GRANT
=
+ f31NEEDS + r32REVENUE + f33POLITIC$1 + 134POP +
They identify 12 papers that analyze intergovernmental grants, or rather they look at
12 different countries. The Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) review shows that the
kind ofmodel they examine can generate an adjusted R-Square of 0.9.
Some of the studies use state/province dummies in cross-sectional analysis, so it
should not be so surprising that these R-Squares should be so high. The comparative
results they present are shown in Table 1 here:
6Table 1: Table 1 taken from Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004)
Expenditure Fiscal capacity Political Population R2
needs power size
Argentina Pop.density: - Income: - Political rep.: + Population: - 0.8$
Political
support: +
Australia Exp needs ratios: us Political rep: + ns 0.90
+
Brazi] ns Income: + Political rep.: + ns 0.90
Indonesia Poverty: + GRP: + ns ns 0.23
Reg. prices: +
Israe] Dependent Local deficit: + Political Population: - 0.64
population: + support: +
Japan Urban: ns Income: + Political rep.: + ns 0.97
Mexico HDI: + HDI: + Political rep.: + ns 0.79
Political
support: +
Nigeria Poverty: NS Fiscal capacity: ns Population: - 0.63
Pop Density: NS +
School-aged: NS
Russïan Social service Profits: - Spec.Status: + Population: - 0.62
Federation delivery index: + Political
support: -
Tanzania Poverty: + HI-1 expend: + Urban: + Population: - 0.52
School-aged: +
Uganda Pop density: + Poverty: - ns Population:- 0.62
Poverty: -
United Urbanization: - Income: + Political ns 0.73
States support: +
Sources: Argentina (Porto and Sanguinetti 2001); Australia (Worthington and Dollery
199$); Brazil and Mexico (Kraemer 1997); Indonesia (Brodjonegoro and Martinez
Vazquez 2004); Israel (Alperovish 1984); Japan (Meyer and Naka 1999); Nigeria (Alm
and Boex 2001); Russian Federation (Treisman 1996); Tanzania (Boex 2003); Uganda
(LGfC 2003); and the United States (Wallis 1996)
Source: Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004)
Note: ns: not significant
Note: HDI: Human Development Index
Note: GRP: Gross Regional Product
Note: HH: median regional household consumption expenditure levels
7Normative determinants
Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004, 467) state “[...] The empirical literature broadly
supports the normative notion that local govemments with higher expenditure needs
should receive larger transfers.
What exactly are these normative notions? The most important one is presented
here.
Horizontal Eguity:
One of the main roles of government is to transfer wealth (or revenue) from the
rich to the poor. This can be accomplished through direct transfers to individuals (i.e.
welfare, old age pensions, family allowances). Another policy instrument is the transfer
from the central level of government to “poor” provincial governments.
The classic reference is Buchanan (1950) who argues for the equalization of
fiscal “residua” across provinces for individuals of equal revenue. A fiscal residuum is
the difference between what a citizen receives in benefits and what he/she pays in taxes.
The residuum is also referred to as the “net fiscal benefit”.
What’s important is that an individual who earns, say $35,000, receive the same
net fiscal benefit (residuum) regardless of the province he lives in. A rich person should
not be penalized by lower than average public services because his neighbours are poor.
The unemployed should not have the opportunity to ‘free rid& by moving to areas of
greater prosperity that offer more public services. So transfers from the federai
government, by allowing poorer provinces to supply more public goods than they could
on their own, may help “equalize” the residua of individuals of equal position (i.e. of
the same revenue) in different provinces.
Yet Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004, 469) point out: “Perhaps one of the
more surprising facts uncovered by the current comparison of international practices is
the finding that the impact of local revenue capacity on intergovernmental grants is
generally positive. In almost ail countries reviewed, wealthier local governments
8receive greater intergovernmental transfers while poorer local governments receive
smaller transfers”. So the coefficient on the REVENUE variable is sometimes positive,
although we would expect a negative relationship.
They attribute this counter-intuitive resuit to this notion of “net fiscal
incidence”. Imagine that a rich province generates an average of $4 per person in taxes
for the central government, while another poorer one generates only $1. Central
government revenues are thusly $5. Let’s say the central government transfers $3 to the
rich province and $2 to the poor province. Redistribution has occurred even though the
richer province received more money. Income redistribution cannot be measured by
how much more a poor province receives in relation to another in absolute terms, but
rather it must be measured by how much more it receives in relation to how much it
contributes to the central treasury. Thus, say Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004, 470),
“even in countries where we find a positive relationship between subnational revenue
capacity and intergovernmental grants, on balance the system of intergovernmental
fiscal relations might in fact stiil be redistributive when considering both the incidence
of revenue collections together with the incidence of transfer flows”.
It is possible, though, that this problematic resuit may be due to incorrect
econometric specification, which we shall discuss at some length later on. For now it
will suffice to say, as Wallis (1996, 19) does, that “The effects of income and
urbanization on grants appear to be perverse in a simple pooled-cross sectional
regression, but inclusion of fixed effects and accounting for simultaneous grants and
local expenditures solves the problem.”
fiscal and economic determinants
It is not quite evident at first to see why a (federal) government should transfer money
or tax points to sub-national govermrients if expenditure obligations and tax revenues
are well aligned to begin with. Indeed, if municipalities, provinces, and federal
governrnents tax exactly what they need in order to fulfiil their obligations towards their
9citizens, one may question the role or necessity of transfers. Unfortunately, this ideal
situation is rarely, if ever, achieved — and politics do get in the way.
This section provides both theoretical arguments as to why transfers should exist
and factual examples of why transfers do exist. This section is not a review of the
extensive literature on fiscal relations in a federal setting. It is intended to provide the
non-specialist with some basic theory and real-world examples. There are many more
determinants than are listed here. Those that are highuighted were kept because they are
most relevant for the Canadian case and the exercise at hand.
Efficiency:
Economists are often concerned with market efficiency. Traditional market
failures such as monopolies or externalities may best be addressed through national
legislation. Yet transfers may correct certain other types of rnarket failure, for example
failure in the labour market (described further on).
Administrative costs:
In some cases, particularly for small provinces, total administrative costs may be
lowered if the federal government collects a province’s taxes (sometimes for a fee) and
then hands over the rnoney. Such is the arrangement between 9 of Canada’s 10
provinces for which the federal government collects personal income tax, and 7 of
Canada’ s 10 provinces for which the federal government collects corporate income tax.
One province, Québec, collects its own personal income and business taxes, so that
residents and businesses must file two incorne tax returns. The Canadian federal
government also collects provincial sales taxes in three of the four3 Atiantic provinces,
while in Québec the provincial government collects the federal sales tax and surrenders
the monies to the central level. In these arrangements administrative duplication is
eliminated, reducing the cost of tax collection and increasing absolute yields. Some
benefits may also arise from the national harmonization of the tax system.
Such arrangements do flot count as transfers here. Rather they are simply
administrative agreements.
Prince Edward Island is the province for which this does not apply.
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Ment goods:
A ment good is one that an “outside analyst” views as important but is flot
considered important by the local population. Vaillancourt (1999) proposes that “a
given service may be seen as a ment good by a majority of the national population but
not by a majority in each subnational jurisdiction”. Either way, sub-national
governments wiJl under-provide these public services as cornpared to the quantity that is
considered “optimal” from a national perspective.
Vaillancourt (199) suggests this is behind minority language education in
Canada, as financed through the Officiai Languages Act. This piece of legislation
provides funding for French language primary and secondary education in Canada’s
nine English speaking provinces, and provides funding for English language education
in french-speaking Québec. Ontario, for example, lias a francophone minority that is
500,000 strong, and New Brunswick has a francophone minority community of almost
250,000 individuals, a full third of its population (Paillé 2000).
Externalities:
Sub-national governments may sometimes engage in activities that generate
externalities for the nation or immediate neighbours. Central governments may transfer
money to sub-national governments that produce negative externalities in order to get
them to stop or reduce these harmful activities. In the case of positive externalities, for
example in post-secondary education, transfers would encourage the province to
increase the levei of beneficial activities.
Labour mobility:
The mobility of labour, particularly that of coilege graduates, may justify central
government intervention in higher education. Indeed, obtaining a college degree greatly
increases an individual’s mobility, especially in the first few years afier graduation
(Burbridge and Finnie 2001). This becomes problematic for pubiicly funded higher
education, especially if education is the responsibility of sub-national governments: the
human capital financed by the state/province leaves. In this case, it may be appropriate
11
for the central government to intervene in funding higher education, as the benefits of
this higher education spreads around the country - yet are being paid for by local
taxpayers. $tates/provinces that have net migratory outflows4 will thusly under-provide
higher education as compared to what is considered optimal on a national level. Thus
transfers from the central to the sub-national government may correct for this problem.
This reasoning leads us to an interesting theory for Québec. If french speakers
are less nationally (or internationally) mobile than their English counterparts in the rest
of Canada, then the natural consequence is that universities in Québec should receive
fewer transfers from the federal government in this domain5.
Broadway and Flatters (1982) also suggest that “free migration [may] eventually
lead to an inefficient allocation of labour over the federation” if there are variations in
net fiscal benefits across provinces. In this case equalization can correct this
inefficiency (in addition to responding to equity arguments). The fact that migrants
respond to net fiscal benefits implies that migrants in this environment do not behave in
such a way to equalize the marginal product of labour across the country; they base
their mobility on the incorrect signal. The equalization of the marginal product of
labour across provinces describes its optimal allocation. It is undesirable that workers
migrate in response to differentials in net fiscal benefits, since this movement will
reduce the marginal product of labour in zones of immigration and increase it in zone of
emigration, taking us away from the optimal allocation (if this optimal allocation were
already achieved). Thus Equalization will allow labourers to respond to the correct
market signal, namely the marginal product of labour.
It is not clear how a state/province with net migratory inflows would behave. One
could posit that this sub-national government would also underprovide higher
education. On the other hand it need not invest in its local population if enough human
capital is being “imported”.
Bird and Vaillancourt (2004) suggest this idea as it pertains to overall labour rnobility.
Francophones face greater obstacles when moving, namely they do not speak the local
language (English) if they were to migrate outside Québec. Thus there are fewer
chances that migratory externalities will arise from this group.
12
Foïltical determinants
In this section I present the main classes of political determinants. I first start with one
counter-example to show how rich the literature is.
Silencing dissenting regions:
Treisman (1996) examines the factors that influence grants and transfers in post
Soviet Russia. Much like this study, he examines social needs, fiscal capacity, and
political representation but finds that the most significant determinants are of a political
nature. He says: “If a region’s leaders declared sovereignty as early as 1990, this seems
to have earned it on average about 18,600 roubles6 per inhabitant in additional transfers
and tax breaks in 1992.”
He also remarks that if a region voted heavily against Bons Yeltsin in the 1991
election, it received more per capita grants in 1992. Moreover, if a region’s workers
imposed a costly strike, it also received higher per capita grants. “Together, these
results suggest that in the early Post-Soviet period, challenging Moscow — whether by
elite declaration, mass action or public voting — paid off far better than complaisance”.
Policy coercion:
Policy coercion is most notably achieved in developed countries through the use
of conditional or matching grants. Matching grants are widely used in the United States
for example, as noted by Wallis (1996).
In a conditional grant, the central government offers a transfer as long as the
money is spent on programmes meeting specific criterion (ex. hospital infrastructure
development). This is a way for federal governments to achieve ambitious national
objectives without having to increase their own payroll significantly and it allows some
(optimal) local variation in distribution methods. By accepting this transfer, sub
6 In June 1992, the exchange rate was 125 roubles/USD$1. So this amount would have
been the equivalent ofUSD$130, or about CAD$ 110. Note that immediately after
exchange rate liberalization in 1992 Russia experienced massive hyperinflation. Russia
also had a currency crisis in 1998.
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national governments understand that this money must be earmarked for certain specific
expenditures.
Matching grants add a slight nuance: in these grants central governments match
provincial expenditures on a dollar-for-dollar basis for certain specific programmes.
Total federal outlays usually have a limit for each province. Matching grants thusly
provide an incentive for sub-national governments to align their expenditures with the
federal government’s policy objectives. In Canada, matching grants have been called
“shared-cost programmes” (Perry 1997, 173).
An important point to note is that matching grants or shared cost programs
generally favour richer provincial or state governments. Indeed, the more a sub
national government spends, the more grants it cari receive, and the governments that
can afford to spend more are generally richer. In Canada, this has been one ofthe major
criticisms of (the now defunct) shared-cost programmes, since poor provinces “could
neither afford to accept nor to reject such grants” (Perry 1997, 204).
Political over-representation:
This is one of the most well-known and well-documented political determinants
of intergovernmental transfers. From Table 1 it is clear that this factor is influential in
at least 5 countries. Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) say: “In virtually all countries
reviewed with district-based political systems, disproportionate political representation
(greater representation per capita) consistently results in greater per capita
intergovernmental transfers.”
Political over-representation occurs in two ways. The first when provinces (or
states) of a country each send the same number of representatives to a legislative
chamber. This typically occurs in the upper chamber of a bi-camerai legislative system.
In the United $tates, for example, each state sends two Senators to the Senate. This
naturally leads to greater per capita political representation for less populous states.
The second way in which political over-representation is induced is when small
provinces are allocated a minimum number of representatives. This is the case in
Canada with Prince Edward Island, which is guaranteed at least 4 MPs (Evans 2005).
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Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) suggest that the first effect is generally stronger
than the second. It can be added that the first effect becomes more important as the
policy input of the upper chamber increases.
Atlas et al. (1985) documents this effect in the United $tates.
Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) document this effect in Argentina.
Most recently, Evans (2005) measured this effect for Canada. He does flot,
however, look at transfers, which is the exercise here. He examines federal
expenditures and levels of taxation. There is indeed some variation in average
representation per capita across Canadian provinces, but there is an even greater
variability in representation per capita within each province. He finds a positive effect
of over-representation, even controlling for income per capita. He estimates, using
provincial-level data (there are three estimations on three different data sets) that one
fewer person per electoral riding generates an extra $0.03 per person in spending. At
the mean electoral district size this is an increase of $2,880 in total. He also finds that
districts with fewer people are taxed less, even controlling for per capita income.
Purchasing “swing” regions in preparation for an election:
This theory was formally developed by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) and Dixit
and Londregan (1996). Henceforth I will refer to this model as the “swing” model.
This theory states that in the Iead-up to an election the party in power wiIl transfer
monies to regions where the race is tight, in other words “swing” regions (or where
there are many swing voters). This strategy maximizes the marginal political payoff of
transfers. Indeed, it makes no sense to throw money at states/provinces one knows one
will lose, but it can certainly help turn the tide if poiis show the party in power is onÏy
slightly behind.
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) state that the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit
Londregan model “further predicts grants to be targeted at regions with low income,
since voters with low income have higher marginal utility of income and thus can be
more easily persuaded to vote for a party promising them high transfers than high
income earners”.
15
Rewarding constituents:
This theory was formaily developed by Cox and McCubbins (1986). I will refer
to it henceforth as the “constituent” model. This mode! proposes that central
governments allocate transfers to regions where they already have high support.
Indeed, a risk-averse government wili transfer money to its supporters, somewhat less to
intermediate regions (“swing” regions), and flot at ail to regions where there is high
opposition.
Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004, 470) state: “furthermore, greater political
support in a region of the national government is aimost aiways rewarded by greater
grants as well”.
Population
Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004, 470) state: “A final factor that influenced the
allocation of intergovernmenta! resources with impressive consistency is the size of the
subnational jurisdiction’s population. In every empirical country study in which
population was inc!uded as an independent variable, local governments with larger
population received significant!y fewer per capita grants”.
In the case of population density, it is argued that iower population densities
increase the per capita cost of delivering public services, such that a geographically
uniform distribution of public services requires larger per capita transfers to less
populated areas.
Alternative methods ofestimation
The Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) paper suggests a linear estimator. This is flot
the only possible estimation strategy available. This section presents in a hile more
detail two papers that offer alternative estimation procedures and the rationale behind
their estimators.
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Wallïs (1996):
This paper analyses the allocation of grants in die United States. The main
contribution of this paper to the literature is econometric. What’ s more, this paper uses
panel formatted data — many of the papers reviewed by Boex and Martinez-Vazquez
(2004) use cross-sectional data only.
It will be useful to paraphrase the paper here:
One model of the grant process pictures federal government officials
structuring grant allocations to maximize the value of those grants to
themseÏves and/or their constituents. Congress decides the formula
under which some grants will be allocated and the executive branch has
discretionary control in the awarding of other grants. This translates into
estimating an equation ofthe form:
(1) FG1=a+f3E+yP+E
where fG1 is per capita federal grants to state i, E and P are vectors of
economic and political variables; and the error term, E, is a normal white
noise error.
Equation (1) is not. however, an accurate representation of how the grant
allocation process actually works. Grants are typicalÏy allocated through
a series of formulas that include factors like population, income, or
highway mifeage, as well as measures of state (or local) financial
participation. [...] At one extreme, with strict matching, federal grants
are simply a linear function of state expenditures. [...] Many grants fall
short of strict, open ended matching formulas, but many involve some
attempt to reward states that make a larger effort to cooperate with the
federal goals by rewarding those states with larger per capita grants.
States also differ in ways not captured by economic or political
variables, or captured only imperfectly. These persistent differences
between states produce significant differences in state fiscal activity, as
well as persistent differences in gains. These “fixed effects” can be
controlled for if we have a panel data set that varies over time.
A more appropriate7 set of estimating equations are:
(2) FG1,
=
+ f31SX1 + [2 E1, + fl3P1, + E. + E, + E
(3) SX1, = + 2fG, + ÀZ1, + +E1 + E, + E
‘ The coefficient notation has been modified from its original format
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where ï subscripts refer to states and t refers to time, $X is state
expenditures, Z is a vector of variables explaining state expenditures, and
Eg’S are the errors for the state expenditure equation.
If equation (1) is estimated when equations (2) and (3) are true then
equation (1) estimates will suffer from several defects. One will be
omitted variable bias. This may be a problem for ail variables, but it
turns out to be particularly important for some of the political variables.
The political variables tend to be stable over significant periods of time
and are correlated with s, and s,. The coefficients on the political
variables, therefore, are sensitive to the specification of the error term.
Second, even if state and local expenditures are included as economic
variables in equation (1), the estimates will suffer from simultaneity bias.
This turns out to be important for a number of coefficients, the most
important being per capita income. [...] If states with higher incomes
tend to spend more on social welfare, then estimates of equation (1) will
tend to show that states with higher incomes receive higher grants, in
direct contradiction to the stated goals.”
Thus anytime a fiscal system contains large conditional or matching grants a
two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS) approach is warranted. Simultaneity bias is a
well-known econometric problem, and the 2SLS estimation procedure is its standard
solution.
Islam and Choudhury (1990) test the exogeneity of grants to Ontario
municipalities and find that OLS and 2SLS estimates differ significantly, indicating the
presence of an endogenous variable (spending). Thusly the issue of simultaneity bias
must be taken into account.
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002):
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) examine the distribution of an ecological
sustainable development grant to municipalities in Sweden. I discuss this paper because
it pitted political behavioural models against one another.
In this paper the authors look at the distribution of a “specially designed support
program intended to support, by means of intergovernmental grants, local investment
programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development and to increase municipal
employment”. Municipalities had to apply to the grant program. Only municipalities
1$
were eligible. Projects had to be submitted with fuily detailed proposais, contribute to
ecologically sustainable development, and increase employment in the rnunicipality.
This transfer was apt for vote-purchasing anaiyses for three reasons. First these
transfers were allocated a few months before the Swedish elections. Second, there was
no expiicit formula determining how the grants shouid be allocated. The government in
power decided which of the applying municipalities received a grant and in what
amount. Third, it was easier to “disentangle any possible strategic use of grants from
the equity and efficiency purposes typically attached to intergovernmental grants”. In
other words they did not have to control for traditional normative considerations as they
focused on a single transfer.
In this paper they tested whether the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan
“swing” model best fitted the central government’s behaviour or whether the Cox
McCubbins “constituents” model was more appropriate.
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) employed a probit estimator as their
econometric strategy. They estimated the probability that a municipality received a
grant given certain independent variables. They first ran the model with variables that
captured the effects of the CM model. They then run the sarne model, except that
political variables were replaced by metrics that captured the LW/DL model.
The data did not support the Cox-McCubbins model: some variables were
significant but of incorrect sign. Yet there was evidence to support the Lindbeck
Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model of government behaviour.
Other8 than the tightness of the race, the authors find that lower unemployment
rates, higher environmental ratings, and a larger number of green party voters ail
increase significantly the probability of receiving a grant. It is interesting then that a
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) add several important nuances to the debate taken
from the literature, although this discussion is relegated to a footnote. Some papers
suggest that the absolute amount of resources transfened is not what matters most to the
electorate but rather the number ofprojects (i.e. the number of different transfers) is
what counts. The literature also allows for electorate “awareness” of monies
transferred, and the literature suggests a positive relationship between the number of
projects and electorate awareness. Thus with “awareness” a role for the media is
implicitly allowed.
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program designed to create employment and help the environment is exploited by those
cities that have no employment problems and are already clean. This may be due to
endogenous selection: richer cities have the resources to draft interesting proposais, or
cities already deeply concerned with the environment are the most iikely to apply for
such a “sustainable development” program.
Overali, their approach differs from the one here in its scope. Dahlberg and
Johansson (2002) look at vote purchasing behaviour of one particular grant mechanism.
They daim their approach is appropriate since the equity or efficiency arguments
usually involved are absent. The task of this thesis is to correctly control for the usual
efficiency/equity mechanisms in political estimates.
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3. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND MODEL
In this chapter I present some basics on Canada and on its transfer system. Presentation
of the main transfers will inform us on how to control for the institutional mechanisms.
I will also discuss the political institutions. This will allow correct modeling of
political variables in the Canadian context.
I will then present the four variable linear model. Three variables are fiscal or
economic in nature. The fourth is political.
Data sources
The main fiscal and economic data are from Statistics Canada. They are (with the
specific series number):
- federal to provincial government transfers: CANSIM 384-0011
- Provincial government revenues and expenditures: CANSIM 384-0004
- Provincial GDP, nominal prices: CANSIM table 384-0001
- Population: CANSIM 051-0005
- Other provincial data, namely unemployemt: CANSIM 384-0013
In all, there are 210 observations in the data set, each of the ten provinces for 21
years.
Electoral district (riding) level data for every federal election since 1979 were
provided by the Libraiy of Parliament.
A note on the sample and period selection
The sample ends in 2001 because at the tirne of writing this was the most recent
available and reliable data. Equalization transfers, for example, are only final at best
two years after first disbursement.
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The choice of the start date was made considering changes to national
accounting practices. The way in which provincial GDP was calculated changed in
1981g. It was flot thought of as convenient to have to transform or convert older
versions of GDP figures into new or vice-versa. So the data was selected to ensure
consistency.
The sample also includes only the ten Canadian provinces. Canada also lias 3
territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut). Nunavut was born on April 1,
1999, so the territory is new. Tax and transfer arrangements with these territories are
different. Indeed, the tenitories have their own financing deals, which means we would
have to properly control for these institutions when examining the political aspects. In
terms of per capita transfer payments, these three territories received an average of
$17,050 in 2001. This sum of money is substantially greater than the $500-$2,800
figure for the provinces’0. Yet because ofthe small population this amounts to less than
4% of total federal transfer monies during our sample period. Moreover, the total
population for these three territories isjust shy of 100,000 inhabitants”. The economic
activity there, considering its remoteness, does flot significantly add to the dynamics of
the Canadian economy (although the discovery and exploitation of diamonds and ou
might change this). Yukon is close to Alaska, but Canada’s economic activity is mainly
chaimeled through a west-east corridor parallel to the southern US border. Lastly, these
three territories send only one Member of Parliarnent each (Evans 2005), so an analysis
of strategic political behaviour will be of little value.
Finally, the time period under study is suitable for analysis because it has been a
time of relative stability in the transfer system (in terms of per capita amounts). It is
quite appropriate here to take one moment’s pause to present the historical forces that
have brought us to where we are today. The period 1981-2001 does not exist in a
vacuum.
In 2002 Statistics Canada decided to review provincial economic accounts by adopting
the chain Fischer formula. These changes were to extend retro-actively to 1981. $ee
Statistics Canada website, “Latest development in the Canadian economic accounts”,
released November 7, 2002.
‘ Statistics Canada CANSIM table 051-0001
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Perry (1997, 99) describes the three broad periods of the postwar ear. Between
1947 and 1957, Ottawa and the provinces entered into “tax rentai” agreements, whereby
the federal government iiteraiiy “rented” tax bases for fixed amounts. 1957 saw the
start of tax sharing, whereby the federai government and provinces shared personai and
corporate income taxes, with provinces being aliocated an ever-increasing portion of the
pie. In the third and final phase’2, “After the conclusion of the negotiations for the
1977-1982 period, the federai government wouid no longer offer additional tax room to
the provinces. In fact, Ottawa was not in a position to offer the provinces additionai
resources in any form. The federai government turned instead to fine-tuning the cash
transfers to ensure that it was abie to meet its minimum objectives in the most
economicai fashion”. This fine-tuning is the state of affairs today.
Some basics on Canada
The following tables presents some basic economic and demographic statistics on
Canadian provinces, sorted from Canada’s eastern most to western most provinces.
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The reader should note severai elements from this table. ‘[lie richest province by
far is Alberta, with GDP per head of $43,000. Alberta is fortunate enough to hold vast ou
and naturai gas reserves (the second largest in the world after Saudi Arabia’3). It recently
managed to pay off ail of its provincial debt’4. Ontario is Canada’s second richest
province, with GDP per head of $35,000. Ontario, however, is far more populous and
thus has total GDP almost four times that of Alberta’s. Ontario’s economy is twice as
large in absolute terms as Canada’s second largest province, Québec, and contributes
40% of Canada’s total output. Québec, British Colombia, and Saskatchewan follow with
GDP per head of around $28,000. Canada’s four eastern most provinces are also its
poorest. GDP per head in these provinces is in the $23,000 range.
A quick glance at the data indicates that Canada’ s transfer system is equalizing,
i.e. the poorest regions receive the most per capita transfers.
Types of transfers in the Canadian federal arrangement
In Canada, there are two main types of transfers from the federal government to local
(provincial/municipal) governments, although other arrangements are possible:
- Cash transfers
- Tax point “transfers”
In the first case, money is simply transferred. Cash transfers may be conditional or
uneonditional.
In the second case, the central authority leaves a certain “tax space” and permits the
sub-national government to fill the void. for example, imagine a province that has a 10%
sales tax, half of which is imposed by the province, the other haif of which is imposed by
the federal govermTlent; both levels of government tax the same transaction at 5%. The
central government may, instead of transferring cash, reduce its sales tax by, say, 2% so
‘ The Econornist. September 101h 2005. Volume 376, no.8443. Pg.37.
14 Idem.
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that the province can raise its sales tax by 2%. So money no longer changes hands, but
the federal government has foregone some revenues to the province’s benefit.
The transfer data here are cash transfers only, with the exception of Québec which
receives a tax point transfer in lieu of cash (see Calculating the value of the Québec
abatement).
Composition of transfers
For this study, transfer data was taken from Statistics Canada. These transfers, as defined
by Statistics Canada, are:
- Canada Assistance Plan
- Statutory grants
- Taxation agreements (=Equalization)
- Postsecondary education grants
- Contributions under the Hospital Insurance Act
- Health Resources Fund
- Regional economic expansion payments
- Official languages
- Contributions under the Crop Insurance Act
- Canadian Health and Social Transfer
- Miscellaneous current transfers
- Medicare
- Transfers to provincial universities
Two transfer categories represent 80% of total transfers in Canada at the end of
the period of observation. They are Equalization and healthcare transfers (see Table 3).
Table 3: General transfer components in 2001, billions of dollars
Transfer Amount (Sbillions) Share
Equalization 12.2 34%
Healthcare and social’5 16.7 46%
Other 7.2 20%
TOTAL 36.1 100%
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada data
15$y4 billion of which is the CHST.
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Thusly particular attention will be paid to the functional form of the Equalization
transfer and healthcare transfers.
Transfers to provincial universities, although they are flot direct transfers to
provincial governments, are included in the analyses. The mobility of highly qualified
researchers and the positive externalities they generate for Canada as a whole are sound
economic reasons for federal intervention. These monies are in addition to what
provinces give Canada’s public universities (there are no private universities of
significance in Canada). One could suggest that the federal government is intruding on
provincial jurisdiction (education). for these reasons this transfer is included in the
calculations.
The following table provides summary statistics on transfers from the central
level of government to provincial governments. The table is ordered from the eastern
most to the western-most province. The rnetrics are: per capita transfers, measured in
Canadian Dollars’6, and in nominal terms; transfers as a percent of total provincial
goverment revenues including transfers (so that 50% means the provincial government
receives as much money from Ottawa as it is able to collect in “own source” taxes on its
territory); and transfers as a percent of provincial GDP.
16 A simple rule ofthumb puts $1USD$1.25CAD.
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Stability of per capita grants
Figure I: Real (1992 dollars) federal per capita grants, Canadian weighted average
D)(1
L
>
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada data
One property of the transfer system, as suggested by Perry’s (1997) daim that
Canada is in a state of “fine tuning”, is that the overali level of per capita transfers have
been relatively stable over the period under study. It is clear, though, that the years
1997 and 1992 have significantly lower per capita grants. Indeed, the Canadian federal
government was attempting to reduce its budget deficit during that time period. The
years 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2001 also seem to have a lower level of per capita grants,
although the difference is flot as marked. Since 2001 there has been an up-tick in
federal transfers.
This, however, does flot mean that littie activity was taking place. Indeed, some
transfers were merged with others, whilst large transfers were sometimes spiit into two.
Yet the overail federal commitment was stable over time. Recently, the stability of
provincial transfer income has become an explicit policy target for the federal
government, particularly with respect to Equalization payments.
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Calculating the value of the Québec Abatement
In 1964 the federal government put in place an allowance mechanism for 16 and 17-
year-olds that remained in school or were incapacitated (Finances of the Nation, 8:15).
Québec already had such a program in place and received, instead of cash payments, a
3% tax point transfer. The federal program eventually came to an end. In order to
avoid “the complete revision of the Québec income tax structure” (Finances of the
Nation, 8:15), the federal government continued to allow the 3-point abatement under
the condition that it recoup the entirety of this abatement.
In 1965 Québec received’7 a tax point transfer of 13.5% of the basic federal
personal income tax instead of cash payments for healthcare and social welfare
expenditures.
So Québec receives, in total, a 16.5% in tax point transfer that the 9 other
provinces do flot receive. 0f these 16.5% tax points, 3 percentage points are returned to
the federal governrnent, so that the total abatement (in real terms) is 13.5% of the basic
federal tax. This tax point transfer is collected by Québec in lieu ofcash.
Note should be taken that this tax transfer was designed to be revenue neutral:
Québec receives exactly the same total amount under the abatement than what it would
have received had it accepted the cash transfer. Here, political forces (Québec’s
aspiration towards seif-determination and demands for fiscal autonomy) influenced the
type of transfer, flot its absolute amount.
The value of the abatement was calculated using the federal government’s
personal income tax receipts (CANSIM series v689062: Federal Goverrnent: Direct
taxes from persons). A simple algebraic manipulation will clarify how the value of the
abatement was calculated’8. Let R represent the value of the basic federal personal
income tax base, C the Canadian government’s receipts from this base in Québec, and Q
the value of the Québec abatement. Then,
17 Received or negotiated for.
181 would like to thank Li Zhao of Statistics Canada for this information.
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C = 0.$35R R = C/0.$35
Q 0.165R = Q = 0.165C10.835 = 0.1976C
Thus rnultiplying the federal government’s receipts from the personal income
tax base by 0.1976 will give us the value of Québec’s total abatement, including the 3%
it remits to the federal government. Multiplying the federal government’s receipts from
the personal income tax base by 0.1616 will give us the value of Québec’ s abatement
for healthcare and welfare only.
The real per capita value of the Québec abatement has grown by a yearly
average of 2.4%. Please see Appendix 1 that presents the value of this tax point
abatement.
Throughout this thesis, the total value (16.5%) of Québec’s abatement will be
removed from the province’s “own source” revenues. Then the 13.5% tax point transfer
will be treated as a cash transfer. The 3% tax point transfer for the discontinued Youth
Allowance program is removed from Québec’s own revenues but flot included in cash
transfers since the value of this abatement is returned to the federal government in its
entirety. This will allow consistent treatment ofthe data: the 13.5% transfer is revenue
neutral and other provinces receive the value of this abatement in cash.
This section on the value of Québec’s tax point transfer shows how important it
is to correctly “control” for the institutional mechanisms in place.
The Equalization transfer
The Equalization transfer is one of three major transfer programmes in Canada. It
accounts for nearly a third of all federal transfers in Canada. Indeed, it is such an
important principle in Canadian federalism that it is enshrined in the Constitution Act of
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1982. The Equalization transfer thusly deserves sorne attention, particularly since “[ahi
provinces recognize this program as the cornerstone of Canadian federalism”9.
In 2004 the Equalization transfer underwent some reforms, with more to corne
in 2006 as an expert panel is examining the transfer. The discussion that follows
pertains to the Equalization program during the 1981-2001 time period only.
The Frinciple ofEquaÏization
The Constitution Act of 1982 states in section 36(2):
Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at
reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
It has been noted that although the principle of Equalization is constitutionally
protected, the program in its current forrn is not. The Parliament could achieve the
objective described above with another policy instrument, or it could use another
forrnula.
Equalization ensures that poor provinces will not have to resort to
extraordinarily high levels of taxation in order to provide public services cornparable to
that of other richer Canadian provinces. What underlies the above statement is the idea
that the level of public services should be somewhat uniform or cornparable within a
federation. Buchanan (1950, 589) states: “An individual should have the assurance that
wherever he shouid desire to reside in the nation, the over-all fiscal treatment which he
receives will be approximately the same.” The Equalization transfer is clearly based on
normative factors (as has been discussed above).
An important feature of Equalization is that it is unconditional: provinces may
use this transfer to finance whichever expenditures they so choose.
19 British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, “Statement by the Honourable Merv Leitch,
Provincial Treasurer of Alberta, on Behalf of All Provincial Ministers of finance and
Provincial Treasurers, at the Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Provincial Treasurers,
Ottawa, December 6 and 7, 1976”, in British Columbia Budget, January 24, 1977, at 36.
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The mechanics ofEqualization
Simply and generally put, the Equalization formula, until the reforms of 2004, brings
provinces up to the “national fiscal capacity average”. The Equalization payment
compensates for, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the difference between a standard measure
of per capita fiscal capacity and a province’s actual per capita fiscal capacity. So, for
example, if provincial governments are able to collect an average of $6,000 per person
through taxes but one particular province is only able to collect $5,000 per person
(using average tax rates), then the federal government will fil! in the void by providing
an equalization transfer of $1,000.
The following equation, in which equalizationjercapita1,1 is a province’s per
capita equalization entitlement in year t, describes the transfer:
tper capita standard fiscal capacity - per capita provincial own revenues, if standards > actual
equalizattoiz.percapita I
t O, othenvise
The total transfer is the per capita entitlement multiplied by the province’s
population.
Graphically, per capita equalization payments can be conceptualized like so:
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Figure II: Graphical representation of per capita equalization payments
Per Capita Equalization entitiement
National standard NL: $4,000
• P.
Per capita fiscal capacity
National Standard
The following graph shows how close to reality this graphical representation
really is. The national standard (as computed by this author from macroeconomic data)
in the year shown is $5350.
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Figure III: Equalization payments and fiscal capacity, 1999
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The scatter points do no exactly fali on the theoretical une because provinces
deviate from the “national average” rate of taxation. Provinces are free to set rates as
they wish. So for example we can see that Ontario has a lower per capita fiscal yield
than the other large provinces. This is because despite a larger base Ontario imposes
lower rates of taxation. Any province that sets taxes above the average rate will lie to
the right (or above) the theoretical une prescribed above; any province that sets taxes
below the average rate will lie to the left (or below) the theoretical line.
I shall now explain in more detail the computation of Equalization payments20.
for the purposes of this exposition, the subscript I represents a province, and the
subscript j represents a tax base. Tax rates in province ï on good j are denoted by r.
20 would like to thank Sean Keenan, of finance Canada, for his helpful comments and
corrections.
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The tax base2’ for r is denoted by b, so that total revenues accruing from this tax, also
called the yieÏd, is the product of r, and b.
for each tax, the total yieid over ail 10 provinces is computed. The total base is
also computed over the 10 provinces. The division of the total national yield by the
total national base gives the average tax rate, ai, for each tax category:
ru b
V]: arj=
Note that the above formula produces a base-weighted average.
Here, an important interpretation of the equalization formula is worth taking a
moment for. Once the mechanism is understood, it becomes clear that the equalization
transfer is flot revenue equalizing, but base equalizing. It compensates provinces for
tax bases they have only Iimited access to (for example corporate income). Moreover,
compensation is determined on the basis of how, on average, Canadian provinces
exploit this base.
Now, a per capita standard measure of each tax base is created. This standard
measure, sm, is a simple average of the per capita tax bases for the five “middle
income provinces”: Québec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.
V]: smj=L
i=ONQC,SK,MB,BCP P
for each province, the difference between this standard per capita measure and
its own per capita fiscal capacity is calculated. Note that what is used to calculate fiscal
capacity is flot a province’s actual rate of taxation but the weighted average tax rate
21 The base ofa tax is what the tax rate is appiied to. Taxable income (with some
adjustments) is the base for income tax, for example. Other bases include the sales of
goods and services, or the value of residential and commercial property.
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computed above. We will cali this the per capita fiscal capacity differential, denoted
and it is allowed to take a negative value:
ar. b..
Vt,j: d = smj aij — papi
Equalization entitiements are the sum 0f ail these “fiscal capacity differentials” -
positives and negatives canceling each other out - multiplied by the province’s total
population. If the entitiernent is negative, you receive no equalization payment.
pop1 if >0
Vt: equat1
=
0, otherwise
Provincial governments have access to a whole array of taxes, from traditional
taxes on personal and corporate income, to excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and
gasoline. Perry (1997) shows more explicitly the array of taxes used in the computation
of equalization entitiements and an example of the computation in a matrix format. It is
presented in Appendix 2. The interested reader can look at the table to see the wide
variety and alternative definitions of tax bases to which provinces have access.
In sum then, per capita equalization payments are equal to the difference
between what a province couÏd collect at the 10-province weighted average tax rate on
the 5 province per capita standard measure of the tax base and what a province couÏd
collect if it applied the 10-province weighted average tax rate to the per capita tax base
it actually has access to.
Size and importance ofEqualization transfers
In the Statistics Canada data source, Equalization transfers are included in the general
category of “Taxation agreements”. This categoiy includes a share of utilities taxes,
federal estate taxes, and so-called reciprocal taxation agreements. The amount of these
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transfers is at least one order of magnitude smaller than Equalization transfers. $o
Equalization payments have a slight measurement enor. For Alberta, which has neyer
received Equalization payments, the figures below have an average imprecision of $63
in 1992 dollars. This represents 1% of own revenues, while Equalization solely is 0%.
This is the worst case. For Ontario, the average per capita transfer is $8. It should also
be $0. Finally, British Columbia received no Equalization transfers in the period under
study, and the average amount of other transfers included in the data series is $3.
The following table shows the cumulative importance of Equalization payments
over the 19$ 1-2001 period. Per capita sample statistics are in real dollars. We see
from this table that Equalization payments are very important for the provincial
governments of Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and
New Brunswick: for these provinces Equalization represents a fifth to a quarter of total
provincial resources including other federal transfers. They are also important for
Québec, as Equalization payments represent 10% of the total provincial government
budget for this province.
The columns in Table 5 showing “equalization” as a percent of provincial
government revenues have been modified to reflect the fact that British Columbia,
Ontario, and Alberta did not receive Equalization payments in the period under study
(the figures have been set to 0% for these three provinces). However the per capita
absolute amounts are still reported; these have not been set to zero.
Note that negative equalization is due to the fact that during years in between
censuses the formula uses population estimates. When more certain population
estimates are produced, it is sometimes the case that the federal government has
overpaid (i.e. population estimates turned out to be too high). Provinces must reimburse
this difference.
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Equalization thusly represents at least 22% of total provincial government
revenues for Canada’s four poorest provinces.
Healthcare funding, social funding, and the CHST
Overail healthcare transfers were computed as being the sum of the cash components of
the following transfers:
- Canada Assistance Plan (CAP)
- Postsecondary education grants
- Hospital Insurance Act
- Health Resources Fund
- Canadian Health and Social Transfer
- Medicare
- Québec abatement (13.5%) as calculated above
I describe briefly the historical factors that have influenced healthcare funding
and social welfare funding in the period under study. Whereas Equalization was
relatively stable, programmes for healthcare and social welfare went through substantial
reforms. At the end of the period under study the main healthcare transfer was the
Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which was in fact two transfer programs
combined into one. Today the CHST has been spiit into two parts, the CHT and the
CST. Let me present the historical evolution of the main healthcare transfers for the
period under study and the basic mechanics.
In the 1970’s provincial governments were asking for increased autonomy in
healthcare and education. They received it. In 1977 Established Programs Financing
(EPF) replaced a system of matching grants (see Laurent and Vaillancourt 2004 for a
succinct historical timeline). It replaced, for example, the Medicare programme whose
costs were shared 50/50 with the federal government. There were three transfers under
EPF: two for health services and one for post-secondary education.
The nomenclature “Established Programs Financing” can be explained by the
fact that by that point in time expenditures in healthcare and education had become
“well established”; both levels of government and the electorate knew full well these
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programs were central to the government’s mission (Perry 1997, 243). The need for
these programmes, as well as their importance, lefi no doubt.
Unlike its predecessors though, EPF was flot a matching grant system, but a
loose conditionai grant system targeted towards broad expenditure areas. The upside
then was that under EPF there were no real specifics other than general (national)
guidelines. An example of a conditional grant before EPF: the Health Resources fund
created in 1965 was specifically targeted “to help the provinces meet the capital costs of
planning, acquiring, constructing, renovating, and equipping health training and
research facilities” (Perry 1997, 188). No such hard constraints existed under EPF.
The EPf transfer was composed of two parts. The first was an income tax point
transfer (13.5% of the basic federal income tax).
The second part was a trident of cash transfers. “The basic cash contribution
consisted of 50 percent of the federal national per capita contributions for the three
established programs in 1975-76 plus $7.63, multiplied by provincial population and
adjusted by an escalator that represented the average increase in gross national product
per capita over the previous three years” (Perry 1997, 250). Because the tax point
transfer had a different value for different provinces (with tax points being worth more
in richer provinces), the federal govermnent provided “equalization” payments to
ensure that per capita payments were the same across ail provinces. The third and final
cash component was a $20 per capita transfer for “extended health care service”
programmes, to be escalated with GNP (Perry 1997, 253).
The Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) replaced in 1965 a whole myriad of social
transfers. CAP was the last large shared cost program in Canada. The costs of social
assistance and welfare programmes supported by CAP were split 50/50 between the
federal and provincial governments. In other words the federai government matched
provincial expenditures on a dollar-for-dollar basis. “What distinguished CAP from
earlier federal programs was the open-ended nature of the federai assistance it provided
and the freedom it gave provinces to set benefits and rates of assistance” (Perry 1997,
197).
Thus during the period under study the presence of a system of conditional
grants is noted. In fact, CAP transfers were oniy about haif as large as EPf transfers.
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for example for the fiscal year 1986-1987 Ontario received more than $3 billion in EPF
transfers and over $1.1 billion in CAP transfers. Perry (1997) presents appendices that
detail transfer payments.
Established Program financing and CAP were merged in 1996 into the Canada
Health and Social Transfer (CHST).
The CHST, like the EPf, is a mix of tax point and cash transfers. The tax points
consist of 14.9% (3 1.4% in the case of Québec due to opting-out agreed to in 1966) of
the basic federal personal income tax and 1.0% of taxable corporate income
(Vaillancourt and Laurent 2004, 7). A tax point transfer allows greater provincial
autonomy. But tax points are flot the entirety of the transfer. The federal government
calculates the per capita CHST transfer. The difference between this amount and the
value of the tax transfer is made up in cash. The cash portion of the transfer is thusly
equalizing.
It is worthwhile to highlight again the design of the CHST. The CHST is aflat
per capita transfer alÏocated to ail provinces. The federal government determines the
per capita amount of this transfer. Each province first receives 13.5% of the basic
federal personal income tax under this transfer. The federal government calculates the
value of this tax point transfer. The difference between the per capita CHST amount
and the value of the tax point transfer is then paid in cash. According to certain
estimates (Vaillancourt 2002) Newfoundland receives 55% of its CHST transfer in cash
while Ontario receives 45% ofthis transfer in cash.
Political modeling
Political factors can be introduced into transfers in two ways. The first way is in
mechanism design, where one subnational jurisdiction or population sub-group is
favoured systematically; preferential treatment may become institutionally or
constitutionally engrained. The second way in which politicians may interfere is
through discretionary funds. In this case the executive branch or cabinet sets up a
temporary transfer program.
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Political gains may be realized in two ways. The first is vote purchasing.
Transfer programmes are aimed at particular groups of individuals in return for votes.
Second, voters may reward a government that sets up an appropriate transfer program
(the electorate generally supports a government if it is doing a “good job” at resolving
economic or social problems; voters who do not directly benefit from a transfer may
stiil support it if the transfer makes economic sense or if the tTansfer responds to an
individual’s own social welfare function). The difference between the two then is short
term electoral gain versus long-term sound economic policy making that can be
politically rewarding.
FoÏitical institutionaÏframework
A succinct explanation of the Canadian political system is warranted here in order to
help understand the political (voting) measures. Canada’ s central government closely
resembles the British Parliamentary system. Members of the House of Commons
(Members of Parliament or MPs), are elected in a plurality vote in a single round
election and on a territorial basis (Vaillancourt and Bird 2002). In 2005 there are 30$
seats in the House of Commons, each representing one riding22. A candidate is elected
to the House of Commons if he wins the plurality23 of votes in his riding. The party that
has the most seats in the House of Commons forms the government.
Provincial governments are similarly set-up.
Canada also has a Senate, although it is highly ineffectual and quite vestigial.
Its members are appointed by the Prime Minister and serve until they reach the tender
age of 75. Not once since 1939 has the Senate vetoed a bill that has been passed in the
Commons (Vaillancourt and Bird 2002).
22 A riding is simply an electoral district. In sparsely populated provinces, a riding can
cover vast expanses of land. In dense urban areas, simply a neighbourhood or a suburb.
23 Plurality differs from majority in that plurality does not imply more than 50% of
votes. In a strict majority election, for example, a person cannot be elected unless they
have received 50% ofthe vote.
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Modeling must take into account the national political structure, flot only federal
parliamentary workings. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) use one political variable that
may be appropriate in Sweden but is flot appropriate in the Canadian situation. They
estimate the effect of municipal political alignment with the central government on the
probability of receiving a grant, in two ways. During their period of observation
socialists forrned the central government in Sweden. The first political alignment
measure they use a binary variable equal to 1 if the municipal council contains a
socialist majority. The second measure is the share of voters in that municipality that
voted for the socialists in the previous election. Both of these measures assume that the
same parties (same organizations) appear at both the central and municipal level, and so
some interaction between the two levels of government occurs. The United States are a
clear example of partisan alignment between the state/local and federal level. The
Republican Party and the Democratic Party are truly national parties that field
candidates at all levels of government, from the President, to state legislatures, to
governors. In Canada, there is very littie alignment between provincial parties and
federal parties that bear the same name. This does not mean that Canadian parties that
bear the same name do not share the same broad ideological agenda. However, policy
platforms are different from one province to the next. And political parties from one
province to the next are distinct legal entities with their own organizations. There is
very little crossover between provinces, and only a little crossover between the federal
and provincial political parties.
Recent History
The four main parties on the national scene are the Liberal Party, the New Democratic
Party (NDP), the Progressive Conservatives, and the Bloc Québécois.
During the period of study, only two parties have been elected to the
governrnent: the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Liberals held power for 12 years,
and the Conservatives 9. Federal elections were held in 1980, 1984, 1988, 1993, 1997,
and 2000. The Liberal Party was in power at the start and at the end of our period of
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study, while the Conservative Party was in power during the middle. Indeed, the
Liberals won the 1980, 1993, 1997, and 2000 elections, whilst the Conservatives were
elected in 1984 and 1988.
It is noteworthy that minority governments are not observed during this period.
Some have argued that provinces are able to extract greater transfer payments (or better
agreements) when the party in power is in a minority.
Several political trends are worthy of attention, particularly in light of this study.
The first is the volatility of voting patterns in Québec. During the early Liberal reign,
Québec sent 74 Liberals to the House of Commons out of a total possible 75, and only 1
Conservative. During the Conservative majority of 1984-198$ and 1988-1993, the
province elected 5$ and 63 Conservative party candidates. Then followed the rise of
the Bloc Québécois. In 1993, the voters of Québec elected Bloc Québécois candidates
in 54 ridings. During the 4 subsequent years, the Bloc Québécois formed the officiaI
opposition in the House of Commons, a role that is now fihled by the Conservative
Party.
The second trend worthy of attention is the rise, fall, and rebirth of the
Conservative Party of Canada. This paragraph could also be interpreted as a recent
history of the conservative movement in Canada. The timeline presented here is by no
means exact to the day, but the basic story is nonetheless accurate24. In 1993, and afier
being in power for fine years, onÏy two Progressive Conservative (PC) candidates were
elected to the House of Commons. Indeed, there was a huge backlash against the PC
party, the reasons for which are beyond the scope of this text. Suffice it to say that the
sentiment against the PC party was strong enough that another conservative alternative,
the Reform Party of Canada, hitherto sans MP, won 52 seats in that same election. In
the 1997 election, the Reform party, with its main stronghold in Alberta and British
Colombia, won 60 seats. The Progressive Conservative (PC) party won 20. Thus, the
total for the conservative movement in that election was $0. In 2000, the Reform Party
transformed itself into the Alliance Party in an attempt to unite the Canadian right. In
that election the Alliance Party won 66 seats and became the officiai opposition in the
24
www.answers.com; articles on Canadian Alliance, Progressive Conservative Party,
Conservative Party of Canada
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House of Commons. In the 2003 election, the Alliance Party merged with the battered
Progressive Conservative party to form the Conservative Party of Canada. This move
was necessary to effectively combat Liberal dominance; the conservative movement
needed to consolidate its base. Indeed, the PC party was truly a national party (when it
was in power it held 58 and then 63 of Quebec’s 75 seats, for example, and the mai ority
of seats for ail four Atlantic provinces in the 1984 election), but the Alliance (Reform)
party was highly regionalized. This consolidation strategy may have paid off. The
Liberal party was forced into a minority position with 135 seats while the Conservative
Party tallied 99 seats in the 2004 election. In the January 2006 elections, two weeks
before final submission of this thesis, the Conservative party won the plurality of seats
in the House of Commons. However, they did not win enough seats to become a
majority government.
As such, considering the recent consolidation of the Canadian conservative
movement and the fact that the Reform and Alliance parties are the same parties except
under different names, votes and seats for the Alliance, Reform, Progressive
Conservative, and Conservative party have been aggregated into one.
The following table shows voting patterns, in terms of both the number of MPs
and the total national voting percentages:
DT
ab
le
6:
N
um
be
r
o
fs
ea
ts
*
a
n
d
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
po
pu
la
rv
o
te
s
fo
r
ea
ch
o
ft
he
m
a
jor
pa
rt
ie
s
in
C
an
ad
a,
19
81
-2
00
1
D
D
Y
ea
r
B
lo
c
Q
ué
bé
co
is
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
ti
v
e
(A
lli
an
ce
+
R
ef
or
m
+
L
ib
er
al
P
ar
ty
PC
+
C
)
O
th
er
T
ot
al
*
N
D
P
Se
at
s
%
V
ot
es
Se
at
s
%
V
ot
es
Se
at
s
%
V
ot
es
Se
at
s
%
V
ot
es
Se
at
s
%
V
ot
es
19
81
0
0%
31
19
.7
%
14
7
44
.4
%
10
1
32
.5
%
0
3.
4%
27
9
19
82
0
0%
31
19
.7
%
14
7
44
.4
%
10
1
32
.5
%
0
3.
4%
27
9
19
83
0
0%
31
19
.7
%
14
7
44
.4
%
10
1
32
.5
%
0
3.
4%
27
9
19
84
0
0%
30
18
.8
%
40
28
.0
%
20
8
50
.0
%
1
3.
1%
27
9
19
85
0
0%
30
18
.8
%
40
28
.0
%
20
8
50
.0
%
1
3.
1%
27
9
19
86
0
0%
30
18
.8
%
40
28
.0
%
20
8
50
.0
%
1
3.
1%
27
9
19
87
0
0%
30
18
.8
%
40
28
.0
%
20
8
50
.0
%
1
3.
1%
27
9
19
88
0
0%
42
20
.3
%
81
31
.9
%
16
9
45
.1
%
1
2.
6%
29
2
19
89
0
0%
42
20
.3
%
81
31
.9
%
16
9
45
.1
%
1
2.
6%
29
2
19
90
0
0%
42
20
.3
%
81
31
.9
%
16
9
45
.1
%
1
2.
6%
29
2
19
91
0
0%
42
20
.3
%
81
31
.9
%
16
9
45
.1
%
1
2.
6%
29
2
19
92
0
0%
42
20
.3
%
81
31
.9
%
16
9
45
.1
%
1
2.
6%
29
2
19
93
54
13
.6
%
8
6.
8%
17
5
41
.2
%
54
34
.7
%
1
3.
6%
29
2
19
94
54
13
.6
%
8
6.
8%
17
5
41
.2
%
54
34
.7
%
1
3.
6%
29
2
19
95
54
13
.6
%
8
6.
8%
17
5
41
.2
%
54
34
.7
%
1
3.
6%
29
2
19
96
54
13
.6
%
8
6.
8%
17
5
41
.2
%
54
34
.7
%
1
3.
6%
29
2
19
97
44
10
.7
%
20
11
.0
%
15
3
38
.5
%
80
38
.2
%
1
1.
6%
29
8
19
98
44
10
.7
%
20
11
.0
%
15
3
38
.5
%
80
38
.2
%
1
1.
6%
29
8
19
99
44
10
.7
%
20
11
.0
%
15
3
38
.5
%
80
38
.2
%
1
1.
6%
29
8
20
00
38
10
.7
%
13
8.
5%
16
9
40
.8
%
78
37
.7
%
0
2.
3%
29
8
20
01
38
10
.7
%
13
8.
5%
16
9
40
.8
%
78
37
.7
%
0
2.
3%
29
8
*
Pl
ea
se
n
o
te
th
at
fo
re
ac
h
ye
ar
th
er
e
w
er
e
3
m
o
re
se
at
s
in
th
e
le
gi
sla
tu
re
th
an
th
e
to
ta
lp
re
se
nt
ed
he
re
.
Th
e
th
re
e
te
rr
ito
rie
s
ea
ch
se
n
d
o
n
e
M
em
be
ro
fP
ar
lia
m
en
t t
o
th
e
H
ou
se
o
fC
om
m
on
s.
Se
e
Ev
an
s
(20
05
)f
or
th
e
n
u
m
be
r o
fe
le
ct
or
al
di
str
ic
ts
pe
rp
ro
vi
nc
e
in
ea
ch
fe
de
ra
le
le
ct
io
n
sin
ce
Co
nf
ed
er
at
io
n.
47
One can also see from the table above that having a geographically narrow base may
be politically rewarding in the context of Canadian federalism. Compare the number of
seats won and vote percentages between the Bloc Québécois and the NDP. The BQ has
its base in Québec only, while the NDP is a truly national party, with MPs being elected
in British Colombia, Manitoba, $askatchewan, Ontario, and some eastern provinces.
The BQ is able to generate twice as many seats as the NDP with the same number of
votes.
The table below displays cumulative political variables over the 1981-2001 period.
It is intended to show that for certain provinces political analysis is tantamount to
imposing joint significance tests on provincial dummies (for example for the
conservative vote for the Western-most provinces).
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The most important of these “political fixed effects” is the case of the two
westernmost provinces, British Columbia and Alberta. Indeed, one can easily argue
that the conservative vote is a provincial fixed effect for these two westernmost
provinces.
Imagine analyzing transfers through political dummies, for example a dummy
equal to one if the province sent more conservative representatives to the buse of
Commons than any other party. Then for these two provinces the dummy would be
equal to 011e, which is the same as imposing a joint significance restriction on the
provincial dummies.
A variant of this theme is the Bloc Québécois. Since no other province has
elected or voted for BQ candidates, any analysis using either the number of seats or the
vote share will measure Québec fixed effects after 1993. So instead of measuring the
joint significance of several provincial dummies, any analysis using the Bloc Québécois
will in fact be equivalent to a Québec provincial dummy for the latter half of the period
under study; the Bloc Québécois vote captures a part of the Québec provincial fixed
effect.
Definition ofpoliticaÏ variables
Variables were computed using riding level (electoral district) political data on every
federal election in Canada since 1979. These data were provided by the Library of
Parliament. from this micro or riding-level I computed variables that capture the two
political behavioural models. I was also able to compute party vote shares and a
variable capturing representation per capita.
The variables constructed here use actuaÏ election data. In other words the
tightness of a given race can only be measured ex post. This may be problematic if, for
example, in the run-up to an election transfer programmes designed to purchase votes
were successful enough to make the riding an easy win. One would thusly prefer
riding-level opinion polls, but these are unavailable.
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Although the original “swing” and “constituent” models are more formally
developed in the original papers than it is here, it is worthwhile to discuss some
empirical modeling issues that arise when dealing with Canada.
The distribution of preferences becomes slightly more problematic in plurality
legislative elections than it is in the case of the United States. The United States use the
Electoral College system, where the totality of a state’s Electoral College votes goes to
the winner of the state (except for the state of Colorado). In this case the per capita
strategy is simple since per capita Electoral College votes are approximately equal
across states: per capita grants should decrease as the difference between Republican
and Democratic votes increases.
In the Canadian case it is not so clear how transfers to a provincial government
affect heterogeneous electoral district level preference distributions. Québec sent 75
representatives to the 300-odd House of Commons throughout the period under study.
What if during an election only 5 ridings are tight? The effect of a transfer to the
provincial government is thusly dissipated, as opposed to a direct transfer to individuals
in this riding. What’s more, the transfer policy must be designed to target these swing
voters (for example if “undecideds” are of a particular ethnie or linguistic background,
or if they are concerned about one particular policy issue).
f irst, in order to test the “swing” model, several measures of tightness of race
were constructed. There were two broad sets of measures, one using overali votes in
the province, and the other using the proportion oftight races.
Variables swing2 and swing5 are dummy variables equal to one if difference
between the winner of the overali popular vote and the second place party was 2% and
5%, respectively, in the previous election. 17 or 8.1% of our observations were swing
provinces at 2%, and 55 or 26.2% ofthe observations were swing provinces at 5%.
The argument for a variable defined this way is of the type “a rising tide lifts all
boats”. There is in fact a statistically significant empirical correlation (at the 1% level)
between the tightness of the overail race and the tightness of individual ridings.
Although this measurement may have some weaknesses because percentages of votes
do not translate directly into seats, it is nonetheless a good starting point.
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The problem with this measure is that a province can remain a swing province
three years after an election because of the panel-formatted data set. These two
variables were thusÏy shifted two years into the past25 and are called fswing2 and
fswing5 (f for before and afler). These variables were also restricted in another way:
they were reset in the third year after an election26. Shifting into the past makes sense:
politicians would have access to pre-election survey data (opinion polis) and would
thusly increase transfers to swing provinces. It is not unreasonable to see this behaviour
afier an election either. If the newiy elected government narrowly won or lost certain
provinces, it might immediately change the transfer to give more money to these
provinces in preparation for the next election. If a government is to systematically
favour one group over an other, it should probably start doing so as soon as possible to
ensure an casier race the next time around.
The variables bswing2 and bswing5 are also dummy variables, except these are
equal to 1 in the electoral year and two years preceding the election if the province was
an overall swing at 2% or 5% (b for before). This variable is meant to capture
behaviour related to the electoral cycle.
We also used the percentage of ridings that were tight races. This is important
for the distributional reasons discussed above. These variables are called
ridingswing2, ridingswing5, friding swing2, fridingswing5, bridingswing2, and
bridingswing5 following the logic described above. The availability of riding-level
data thus makes such distributional nuance possible.
This last set of variables, even if they are distributionally more correct, are a
iittie problematic because they are not continuous and nicely normally distributed
around a mean. Ridingswing2, for example, is equal to zero for 7$ observations (or
37% of the total number of observations), even though it is not discrete.
Second, in order to test the “constituents” model, two dummy variables were
constructed. The first is called voted winner, and it is equal to 1 if the winner of the
25 Let’s say two elections took place, one in 2000 and the other in 2005, and that the
province is a 5% swing province in 2000. The swing5l for 2000-2004, while
fswing5l 99$-2002.
26 So if Manitoba was a swing at 5% in 198$ — which it was — fswing5l for 1987,
1988, 1989, and 1990.
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overall plurality of votes in a province was also the winner of the national general
election. The second is called seated winner, and it is equal to 1 if the winner of the
plurality of seats in a province was also the winner of the national election.
Measures of support for the party in power were allowed to be continuous, not
just discrete. The variable winner votesjirop is the total vote share percentage for the
winner in each of the provinces. The variable winner seatsprop is the percentage of
seats allocated to the winner in that province. This second variable in some sense
measures a province’s lobbying power within the governing party.
Third, partisan variables were measured in two ways. The first measure is
simply each party’s vote share tub, cons, bq, ndp, other). The second set uses the
proportion of a province’s seats going to each party tub seats, cons seats, bqseats,
ndpseats, otherseats).
For regression analysis only variables for the Liberal Party and the NDP are
included. Including ail four major parties would introduce multicollinearity. The Bloc
Québécois vote is eliminated because it captures half of a provincial dummy.
Fourth, and finally, political over-representation was tested. The variable called
seatsfiop is the number of seats per 100,000 inhabitants for the province.
It would be interesting to test the “dissident” effect, as noted by Treisman
(1996), in the Canadian context. It has been suggested that the transfer system was
designed to keep Québec in the federation27. Yet because this would involve including
an “undesirable” provincial dummy, this exercise is not conducted here.
Before moving on it will be useful to present the summary statistics of the
political variables:
27
would like to thank André Nol who pointed this out.
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Note that even though the seated winner and the voted winner variables have
identical sample statistics they are flot necessarily equal for each observation.
Estimator
Recail that Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) suggest the following generic linear
estimation equation:
Table 8: Summary statistics of political measures
“Swing”
model
Variable
swing2
swing5
fswing2
fswing5
bswing2
bswing5
riding_swing_2
riding_swing_5
friding_swing_2
friding_swing_5
briding_swing_2
briding_swing_5
voted_winner
seatedwinner
winner_votes_prop
winner seats pron
Mean
0.081
0.26
0.066
0.21
0.043
0.17
7.35
18.8
7.40
18.6
5.50
12.8
0.552
0.552
54.2
42.8
36.1
16.6
40.4
11.8
Std.
Dcv.
0.27
0.44
0.25
0.41
0.20
0.38
8.96
16.4
9.01
16.6
$ .62
16.0
0.49$
0.49$
32.4
12.1
13.1
10.8
34.8
18.8
“Constitucnts”
model
Min
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20.7
12.7
1.50
0.0
0.0
Max
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
28.6
75.0
28.6
75.0
28.6
75.0
1.0
1.0
100
68.8
68.2
44.2
100
71.4
Obs
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
prov_lib
Partisan prov_ndp
analysis prov_lib_seats_prop
prov_ndp_seatsprop
Over
representation seats pop 1.34 0.60 0.84 3.24 210
PC GRANT
= (3o + I31NEEDS + f32REVENUE + 133POLITICS + 134P0P1 +
54
Which variables should be used for each of the categories? How many variables
are necessary for each ofthe categories? These choices are non-trivial. If the objective
is to estimate political influence in the transfer mechanism, then we must first develop
an unbiased estimator ofthe normative portions ofthe transfer system.
If we cannot estimate functional forms of individual components of the transfer
system without bias, then attempting to estimate political influence in the entire system
is a flawed exercise to begin with.
The following basic model will be estimated using both the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) procedure and a panel Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator
conecting for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity:
reat GRANT$ PCi,t = 13o + f3ireal revenues pcH + P2unernploymentl,, + 3ln(popI,t) +
t34POLITICS1,t + Z1year +
Real variables ail use 1992 as the base year. real GRANTS PCi,t are real per
capita transfers to province i in year t. Real revenues pc are real provincial government
own revenues per capita (what a provincial government can collect from its own saies
taxes, income taxes, excise taxes, etc.). These revenues exclude transfers.
UnernpÏoyment is the unemployment rate and is defined as a percent (O<x<100).
ln(pop) is the natural logarithm of provincial population. f inally year is a vector of
year dummies, which is why it is in bold script.
The FOLITICS variable wilÏ be iterativeiy substituted in order to test competing
models of political behaviour (i.e. swing vs. constituent), and also to test partisan
rewards and the effect of over-representation. In other words the above model is run
once for each of the political variables; only one political variable is included in a
regression.
What’s more, when estimating political influence, the dependent variable will be
specified in two different ways: total transfers and “other” transfers.
When examining Equalization transfers and the entire transfer system, Alberta
will be removed from econometric estimations.
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Before presenting the resuits, I will discuss the reasons why this estimation
procedure was chosen and why the empirical model is defined as it is. The OLS
procedure was chosen flot only because it is a well-lmown, easily interpretable model,
but also because the underlying assumptions upon which this estirnator is based were
generally verffied. The variables used for the empirical analysis were also carefully
selected.
Correctingfor serial correlation and heteroscedasticity
STATA provides a panel estimator that corrects for serial correlation. Considering the
time-series nature of the data, correcting for ARt 1) type serial correlation is appropriate.
It is well known that macroeconomic variables contain such autocorrelation. Indeed,
the estimated factor of serial correlation for the transfer system as a whole is least 0.8.
This estimator applies a constant correction factor across all panels and ah years.
Although this is a strong restriction, it is not too worrisome as we are dealing with
provinces of the same country.
Correcting for serial coi-relation is important. Positive serial correlation biases
coefficient standard errors downward, leading us to believe certain coefficients are
significant when they are not. We would not want this to occur when examining
political variables.
Choice ofvariables
The discussion on Equalization shows that horizontal equity is a factor that needs to be
controlled for. The policy variable that best captures the institutional mechanism is the
fiscal capacity differential. Yet because of the formula’s functional form the fiscal
capacity differential is not a good variable in econometric estimation: it is censored. A
province that has above average fiscal capacity has a differential of zero, flot a positive
differential. 8$ observations are censored this way.
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Real per capita provincial government own revenues will be used as a measure
of fiscal capacity. This variable is chosen over per capita GDP as the measure of
REVENUES. These two variables are highly collinear: the simple regression of one on
the other produces a slope of 0.15 with a standard error of 0.006. The regression R-
square is 0.75. $o including both of these measures would be a mistake, as this would
introduce multicollinearity in the system. Only one measure of income is needed.
This may explain the comment made by Wallis (1996): “Major results are
reversed when more appropriate specifications are used”. He complains at length about
sign reversal. Indeed, results do flip-flop if too many variables are included.
The unemployment variable was chosen over other measures of NEEDS, for
example the proportion of the young and the elderly in the population. The federal
government is responsible for Employment Insurance, and programs financed through
Human Resources and $kills Development Canada may reduce these liabilities. In
other words the federal government has a mandate when it comes to employment, so the
unemployment rate is an appropriate
Results are robust whether we use unemployment or the proportion of the
elderly in the population. The proportion of youngsters in a province did not present
itself to be significant (which may in itself suggest political behaviour: youngsters can’t
vote).
Justfying the linearity assumptions
$catter plots are shown to prove that relationships are linear and that imposing the
linearity assumptions is appropriate. Imposing a linear functional form when the true
relationship is not linear produces a biased estimator.
In fact, the linearity assumption was flot well justified with regards to the
population variable. Taking the natural logarithm, a standard practice when using such
variables, did produce the desired linear functional form.
The first figure plots real per capita transfers against the measure of fiscal
capacity. The outliers to the right are Alberta.
57
The second shows that transfers are a negative function of the log population
size.
The third shows that transfers are a positive function of the unemployment rate.
5$
Figure IV: Real per capita transfers p]otted against real per capita provincial own
revenues
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Figure V: Real per capita transfers plotted against ln(population)
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Figure VI: Real per capita transfers plotted against the unemployment rate
o
o.
o
o
o
o
mu,
Q)
V)
C
cTz C\J
u
Q)
Q
C”
cl) o
o
o
Alberta: one possible source ofbias
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Unemployment rate
There exists one possible source of bias in our OLS estimates, particularly in regards to
the fiscal capacity measure. It arises from the fact that the Equalization transfer is a
piece-wise linear function. Indeed, any province that exceeds the national standard of
fiscal capacity receives no money from the Equalization mechanism.
From the following graph, one can see how Ordinary Least Squares incorrectly
estimates a piece-wise linear function:
e e
•
• e e
e
•
e.
e
.
e
e
e
• e
e •
b •
e •e
•1. •
... e.P •
e • •
.e e
e.
e
e e ?ee e. •
• e
e. • •• •
• f e :. • e
4 e
e
•s
e •e e? te
e ••
e% e e e
e j 4 e... e• e
•b . e •e.
e
o.
5
Source: Author’s calculations
15 20
60
Figure VII: OLS bias of a piece-wise linear function
Per Capita Equalization payments
fiscal capacity
Ordinary least squares analysis will thusly underestimate the magnitude of the
slope in this case. The piece-wise une presented above actually closely resembles the
scatter plot of overall transfers per capita (Figure IV). Eliminating Alberta will remove
the horizontal arm of this piece-wise function and allow an unbiased estimation of the
equalizing factor applied to other provinces.
One can argue that removing Alberta is appropriate, for two more reasons
besides bias in estimation. f irst, Albertan voters will not respond (at the margin) to
monies sent by the Liberal government: they are steadfastly conservative in the period
under study. Second, their marginal utility of money (or public services) is low, since
they already have so much of it (in fact is has been suggested that at this point the
Alberta government is running out ofideas ofwhat to do with its money28).
We can empirically measure the effect of removing Alberta from the sample.
When per capita transfers are regressed only on fiscal capacity and year dummies, the
slope is almost -0.6. Removing Alberta increases the absolute magnitude of the
coefficient to -0.9. When we regress on the full set of controls and correct for serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity, the system goes from an equalizing factor of -0.10 to
Equalization entitiement
National Average
28 The Economist. $eptember 10th, 2005. Volume 376. No.$443. page 37.
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an equalizing factor of -0.15 once AÏberta is removed. The presence ofAlberta causes
the equalizationfactor to be underestirnated by 50%.
Discarding the provincial fixed effects estirnator
It was argued that the stability of the overali system was a desirable property as the
determinants were probably also stable. Stability of the system implies that it is easier
to control for the institutions in place. The stability
- or persistence - of the system is
the exact reason why provincial fixed effects estimators are inappropriate.
The graphs on the next page show the persistent nature of the policy outcome.
The first graph shows the evolution of per capita transfers over time for each of the ten
provinces. The subsequent graph shows the evolution of per capita GDP. For
presentation purposes the average annual 1% increase in real provincial GDP has been
removed (it was considered a common time trend).
If per capita transfers are stable throughout the time period, it is because income
and real economic differences have also been stable. Remember that high per capita
income produces low per capita transfers.
Regressing per capita transfers only on 9 dummies (the base group is Alberta)
produces an R-Square of 0.94. The coefficients on the dummies (flot shown), but they
are ail significant at the 1% level with the exception of British Columbia. When we add
provincial fixed effects to the economic model, the coefficients on the measure of fiscal
capacity and the unemployment rate drop to almost zero and are statistically
insignificant.
Introducing provincial fixed effects sucks out the cross-sectional variation in the
data (it actually sucks out 94% of the variation in per capita transfers across Canada).
Provincial fixed effects wiII capture any policy based on “persistent” macroeconomic
measures, such as per capita income, better than the income variable itself. One will be
mistakenly led to believe that policy outcomes are persistent, while in reality the
policies are based on macroeconomic variables that only happen to be persistent.
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Some economists, notably Wallis (1996), argue for provincial fixed effects.
This may be a reasonable approach given the data he had. Observations were taken
every ten years in bis study. Yet these are unnecessary and undesirable in the case of a
yearÏy panel such as this one.
Figure VIII: Per capita transfers over time to cadi of tic ten provinces
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Figure IX: Real per capita de-trended GDP over time for each ofthe ten provinces
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Just)5%ng the yearfixed effects estimator
The year fixed effects estimator, year dummies are simply added to the linear
regression, is quite appropriate. The year fixed effects estimator permits the intercept of
the linear mode! to vary by year. This wi!! capture overail shifts in the federa!
government’s (per capita) budget constraint.
Year fixed effects will also capture the per capita healthcare transfer that applies
to a!1 Canadians for each of the years under study.
The fo!!owing graph wi!! prove this point.
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Figure X: Real per capita transfers and fitted values plotted against real per
capita provincial own revenues
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The x’s represent transfers in the earliest years, the triangles represent transfers
in the middle years of the period under study, and the hollow circles the final years.
There are also three fitted regression lines: one for each of the three sub-periods.
From the graph above it is clear that total per capita transfers have increased
with time: the linear curve has shfled outwards. The year fixed effects estimator
captures the overall increase in the federal government’ s per capita budget (the budget
constraint moves outward), and permits the intercept of the linear function to change
every year.
The graph above suggests that the slope has remained the same but that the
intercept has shifted. $uch fine-tuning of the model will produce more efficient
estimators.
Endogeneity ofper capita income andper capita tax revenues, 28L$
The Canadian transfer system did present a matching grant mechanism in the period
under study. The robustness of the resuits was verified using the 2SL$ procedure
suggested by Wallis (1996), as well as a pair of alternate specifications. The 2$LS
results did not greatly differ than those of the simple linear model, suggesting that such
a procedure was not necessary.
Appendix 3 is provided to this effect.
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4. RESULTS
I will first present the resuits of the core mode! during which I decompose per capita
transfers into four parts: ail transfers, Equalization, healthcare transfers, and “other”
transfers. I will use each ofthese transfer categories as a dependent variable in the three
variable model. Standard errors are presented in parentheses under each coefficient.
Then, I will show a summary of the iterative procedure resuits. fuli resuits are
presented in Appendix 4
Resuits of the core model
Overail, empirical functional forms closely match expectations.
Total transfers
Table 9 below shows estimation results of the core mode! for total transfers. Each
regression successively imposes another estimation assumption.
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Column (Ti) provides the simplest specification, where per capita transfers are a
function of per capita provincial government own revenues (income). The siope is -
0.4$ and is precisely estimated with a standard error smaller than 10% of the
coefficient’s magnitude. The regression R-Square is 0.37.
Adding a full set of year dummies in Column (T2) almost doubles the factor of
equalization to -0.89. Again it is precisely estimated. The R-Square jumps to 0.62. So
“controlling” for healthcare transfer mechanism by adding year dummies highlights the
redistributive nature of the transfer system.
Column (T3) was provided as proof of coefficient under-estimation in the
presence of Alberta. Here the equalizing factor is -0.5 7 when Alberta is included in the
sample, substantially less than -0.89 in (12), especially considering the small coefficient
standard errors. Notice that the intercept is also lower than the intercept in (12), which
is predicted by f igure VII above.
Columns (T4) and (15) add unemployment and the natural logarithm of the
population, respectively, as controls. As expected, the coefficient on unemployment is
positive, and that on population is negative.
When the unemployment variable is introduced the magnitude of the fiscal
capacity coefficient is diminished. When the population variable is introduced the
magnitudes of both the fiscal capacity and the unemployment coefficients are reduced.
This is a direct result of the correlation between these variables: they capture the same
effect. The estimates remain precisely estimated, however.
Column (16) is the Generalized Least Squares estimation that allows for a
common factor of serial correlation in each of the panels. There is indeed a high level
of serial correlation in the data (it is 0.85). Correcting for positive autocorrelation
increases the coefficient standard errors as predicted by econometric theory.
Nonetheless ail coefficients remain significant that the 1% level.
The point estimate of the unemployment coefficient in (16) is 34.9, which
suggests that on average a one percentage point increase in the provincial
unemployment rate increases per capita transfers by about $35.
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As for the population variable, it needs to be interpreted carefully29. A one
percent increase in the population will decrease per capita transfers by $3.85 in (16).
The coefficients are slightly different between (T5) and (T6), but they are of the
same order of magnitude. A smaller unemployment coefficient is compensated for by a
more important population effect.
Overall, the system is equalizing, with the degree of equalization diminishing as
other controls are added. The linear model with year fixed effects and tbree
independent variables, column (T5), generates an R-Square of 0.86, which is quite
strong.
29 When the independent variable is expressed in log form the partial derivative is
expressed as: = r33%Ax/l00
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Equalization
Table 10: Resuits of the “core” model estimation, “Equalization” transfers
Per capita “Equalization” transfers
(fi) (f2) (f3) (f4)
*: signfficant at the 10% level;
10% level
Note: Year fixed effect coefficients flot shown
The R-Square of regression (Fi) is 0.69. The coefficient on the fiscal capacity
measure is -0.82, which is close, but flot close enough, to -1.0, the functional form
suggested by mechanism design; the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient is [-
0.90, -0.74]. The only disadvantage of small standard errors is that in this case the 95%
confidence interval does not include the nuli hypothesis of 3i=-l. In fact, the variable
used here is flot the variable used in the actual mechanism. The equalization transfer
Real per capita
provincial own
revenues
Unemployment
ln(Population)
Constant (1981)
Restriction
R-square
Log-likelihood
No. obs.
Method
-0.82 -0.36 -0.10 -0.12
(0.042)*** (0.041)*** (0.047)** (0.046)***
55.0 37.1 49.2
(6.77)*** (9.27)*** (8.15)***
-208 -318 -198
(17.1)*** (32.2)*** (2$)***
3245 4254 5224 3610
(1$0)*** (263)*** (466)*** (377)***
Alberta Alberta Alberta AB, ON, BC
removed removed removed removed
0.69 0.88
-1125 -860.77
189 147
Year FE Year FE OLS, Year FE, GLS, Year FE,
AR(0.86), AR(0.77),
heteroscedastic heteroscedastic
panels panels
189 189
**: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the
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uses a fiscal capacity dfferential. This explains the fact that the estimated slope is flot -
1. A variable measuring the fiscal capacity differential was created and used in a simple
linear regression. the estimated slope was indeed -1. This variable is censored so the
resuits are flot presented here.
The R-Square in (El) is 0.69 and it is higher than the R-Square of the same
regression mode! applied to the entire transfer system (0.62 in (T2)).
Adding the control variables reduces the coefficient magnitude of the fiscal
capacity variable. The resuits are as expected and are highly significant.
The regression in (E2) has an R-Square of 0.88, higher than when the entire
system is considered with the same controls.
Finally, regression (E4) removes Alberta (AB), British Columbia (BC), and
Ontario (ON) from the sample. Over the period under study none of these provinces
have received equalization payments. Results are flot that different, and an increased
(more positive) point estimate on the population variable compensates for a smaller
constant term.
Overall, a simple one variable linear regression produces an R-Square of almost
0.70 for Equalization. Examination of the regression R-Square is appropriate: it is
important to be able to explain individual components of the transfer system better than
the entire transfer system itself.
Healthcare and social wefare transfers
The following table presents regression results for healthcare, social, and postsecondary
transfers. Postsecondary transfers are included here because they were part of the
Established Programs Financing set of transfers. They are now included in the CHST.
For simplicity I will refer henceforth to the combination of these three transfers
categories as healthcare and social transfers; the reader should keep in mmd that
postsecondary grants are included.
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In order to present the year dummies, coefficient standard errors are presented
next to the coefficient, as opposed to directly under them as previously. This method of
presentation is used onÏy here.
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Table 11: Results ofthe “core” model estimation, healthcare and social transfers
Real per capita healthcare and social transfers
(Hi) (H2) (H3)
Coefficient (Std.Error) Coefficient (Std.Error) Coefficient (Std.Error)
Real per capita
provincial
government own
revenues -0.032 (0.0093)*** 0.0033 (0.0068)
Unemployment 7.97 (2.48)*** 6.08 (1.72)***
In(Population) 11.5 (6.78)* 3•4 (6.76)
1982 -72.9 (26.5)*** -98.6 (7.36)***
1983 -21.4 (26.5) -53.8 (10.1)***
1984 48.51 (26.5)* 15.0 (11.4)
1985 111.9 (26.5)*** 77.0 (12.6)***
1986 48.3 (26.5)* 15.2 (12.8)
1987 31.9 (26.5) 2.26 (13.2)
1988 39.2 (26.5) 12.6 (13.6)
1989 -9.00 (26.5) -37.8 (14.2)***
1990 -40.5 (26.5) -69.6 (14.9)***
1991 -72.4 (26.5)*** -107.8 (15.3)***
1992 -1.44 (26.5) -32.4 (16.1)**
1993 59.1 (26.5)** 27.5 (16.6)*
1994 -13.7 (26.5) -43.2 (17.1)**
1995 -15.1 (26.5) -38.4 (16.6)**
1996 -137.5 (26.5)*** -156.0 (17.0)***
1997 -239.7 (26.5)*** -260.6 (16.8)***
1998 -257.7 (26.5)*** -273.3 (16.6)***
1999 -133.3 (26.5)*** -144.4 (17.0)***
2000 -147.0 (26.5)*** -166.1 (17.6)***
2001 -172.5 (26.5)*** -189.7 (17.0)***
Constant (1981) 492.3 (108.9)*** 662.8 (18.$)*** 660.7 (96.7)***
Log-likelihood -930
R-Square 0.19 0.75
No. obs. 210 210 210
Method OLS OLS GLS, AR(0.84),
heteroscedastic panels
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the
10% level
first, notice the iow R-Square for regression (Hi): it is 0.19. The three control
variables on their own generate an R-Square of 0.79 when the dependent variable is the
entire transfer system. Even though the coefficients are significant, ail their values are a
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full order of magnitude smaller than those produced in regression (T5). What’s more,
the coefficient of the population variable is positive, which is unexpected.
Regressing heaÏthcare and social transfers on only year dummles in (112)
produces many signflcant coefficients and a regression R-Square of 0. 75. Truly the
correct way to model the healthcare and social transfers is through a vector of year
dummies. The importance of the regression R-Square in this case cannot be
understated. At 0.75 with only year dummies, we can be fairly certain that our model is
good.
The dummies for the Ïast 5 years are significant and negative. I have already
mentioned (see $tability ofper capita transfers) the fact that 1996 through 2001 had
lower per capita transfers. This supports the daim made by Vaillancourt and Laurent
(2004, 8) that “The introduction of the CHST was not the product of a new vision of
federalism but simply a resuit of the federal govemment’s need to reduce its deficit”.
Overall, the healthcare and social transfer system is only slightly equalizing.
The coefficient on fiscal capacity is economically small at -0.03 in (Hi) and statistically
insignificant in regression (113). The coefficients for the unemployment rate and the
natural logarithm ofthe population are also economically small.
The constant term in (H3) is easy to interpret. $660.70 represents the per capita
health and social transfer in 1981, measured in real 1992 dollars.
“Other” transfers and comparison
The following table presents the core model when the dependent variable is composed
of “other transfers”, the difference between total transfers and the two transfer
mechanisms described above. Previous regression results are shown again to highlight
the differences in the results.
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Table 12: Resuits ofthe “core” model estimation, “Other” transfers and
comparative analysïs
Total
transfers
(T6)
Equalization Healthcare “Other”
(E3) and social (01)
(113)
Real
provincial own
revenues -0.15 -0.10 0.0033 -0.0069
(O.053)*** (O.047)** (0.0068) (0.0075)
unemployment 34.9 37.1 6.0$ -0.49
(12.2)*** (9.27)*** (1.72)** (3.30)
ln(pop) -385 -318 -3.4 -4$.6
(42.3)*** (32.1 5)*** (6.76) (7.41)***
Constant 7201 5224 660.7 $85.9
(616)*** (466.33 1)*** (96.7)*** (121 .6)***
Restrictions Alberta Alberta none none
removed removed
Log-likelihood -1172 -1125 -930 -1162
No. obs. 189 189 210 210
GLS, Year FE,
AR(0. $5),
heteroscedastic
panels
*: Significant at the 1% level
**: Significant at the 5% level
*: Significant at the 10% level
Note: year fixed effects flot shown
For “other” transfers in column (01), fiscal capacity and unemployment matter
not. The sizes of these coefficients are well, welÏ below those for the entire transfer
system, and they are not significant. Population size is significant, but the magnitude of
the point estimate is much smaller than when we consider the entire transfer system in
(T6).
What’s more, just over half ofthe year dummies (not shown) are insignificant.
This suggests that “other” transfers are not distributed evenly on a per capita basis.
Method GLS, Year FE, GLS, Year FE, GLS, Year FE,
AR(0.$5), AR(0.$4), AR(0.49),
heteroscedastic heteroscedastic heteroscedastic
panels panels panels
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Since normative factors do flot affect the level of “other” transfers, the removal
of Alberta no longer seems justified. The daim that the presence of Alberta biases
downward the coefficient on fiscal capacity is moot if this coefficient is zero, with or
without Alberta. So when looking at strategic vote purchasing through “other” transfers
Alberta wi!l be included in the analysis.
The degree of persistence of other transfers is smalier than when the entire
transfer mechanism is considered. The common autoregressive factor for “other”
transfers is only 0.49 whereas it is above 0.80 when the dependent is the entire transfer
system.
Overali, “other” transfers are less persistent, not driven by normative factors,
somewhat sensitive to the absence of economies of scale (population), and flot
distributed even!y on a per capita basis. These transfers are ripe for political analyses.
Resuits of the ïterative procedure: political variables
I will use total transfers and “other” transfers as alternative definitions ofthe dependent
variable throughout this section.
The process used here is simple. The above three variable mode! was appended
with a measure capturing a particular political hypothesis. The mode! was estimated
and the resuits noted. The politicai metric was removed and replaced by the next. The
model was estimated again, the resuits noted, etc. Only one political variable is
estimated at a time.
The mode! was estimated using a panel generalized least squares (GL$)
procedure. It allows for a common factor of autocorrelation across panels and corrects
for heteroscedastic standard errors. Year dummies were also included.
Alberta is always removed when ail transfers are considered. It is included
when “other” transfers are used as the dependent. For each table I discuss whether
resuits are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion ofAlberta.
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I present the resuits to the regressions in the order I presented the variables in
Chapter 3. Only significarit political variables are presented. Insignificant variables are
marked ns (flot significant).
The resuits for each of the different models are briefly discussed before a more
comprehensive discussion is left to the next section.
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Table 13: Results of the iterative substitution of po]itical variables, “swing” model:
“Swing” model
Ail transfers “Other” transfers
swbtg2 84.2* flS
swingS ns flS
fswbtg2 flS flS
Dummies fswtngs flS ris
bwsing2 ns flS
bswing5 ris flS
riding_swing2 flS flS
riding_swing5 ns ns
friding swing2 flS 1.59 *
Percentages . . —fr1ding_swtng5 ns 1.10 * *
briding_swing2 flS ns
briding_swing5 ns riS
significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10%
level; ns: flot significant
Note: GLS estimator used, correcting for AR(1) type serial correlation and for
heteroscedastic panels. Controls include real per capita provincial own source
revenues, the unemployment rate, the natural logarithm ofthe population, and a full set
of year dummies.
Note: Alberta always removed when all transfers are considered
Only two variables had the correct sign and were statistically significant, and
they were related. These two variables were the percentage of tight ridings before and
after the race, at 2% or 5% (friding swing2 andfridingswing5).
When the dependent is the entire transfer system, no political variable is
significant in the presence of Alberta.
The result on friding swing5 when the dependent is “other” transfers is robust to
removing or adding Alberta. The result on.friding_swing2 is flot.
The fact that the political variable of significance is the tightness of race before
and after an election needs to be explained. This may be because transfers set up in the
run-up to an election have implementation lag time or have a certain amount of inertia,
or both, such that the full effect of a new transfer program is felt after the election. It is
also possible that an electoral promise of more transfers can only be fuffilled once the
new cabinet is created.
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When looking at the entire transfers system, many of the political coefficients
were negative, which goes against expectations. However most political coefficients
were positive when “other” transfers were looked at. If any vote purchasing is going
on, it is flot through the main transfers, but rather through “other” transfers. This not
preclude vote purchasing through expenditure or taxation policies, however, as noted by
Evans (2005).
Overali, it may be that the 2% “tightness” of race measure was too tight. I had
the advantage of riding-level data collected ex post by Elections Canada. It is hard to
believe politicians could respond to a fine-tuned measure they did not have access to.
On the other hand, they do have access to polling data. And we would certainly
expect seasoned politicians to corne to understand the non-linearities of the votes to
seats function. So the non-significance of the various variables indicating tightness of
race is evidence that there is littie vote purchasing going on.
If there were a “swing” effect we would have expected more variables to be
significant — or at least of the correct sign - especially since metrics were altered in
many ways.
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Table 14: Results of the iterative substitution of political variables, “constituents”
model:
“Constituents” model
Ail transfers “Other” transfers
Dummies voted_winner ns ns
seated_winner ns 27.2**
Percentages winner_votes_prop ns 1.2 1**
winner_seats_prop ns 0.39*
***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10%
level; ns: flot significant
Note: GLS estimator used, correcting for AR(1) type serial correlation and for
heteroscedastic panels. Controls inciude real per capita provincial own source
revenues, the unemployment rate, the naturai iogarithm ofthe population, and a full set
of year dummies.
Note: Alberta always removed when ail transfers are considered
The coefficient on seated_winner is $27. $27 is an economically significant
amount. For exampie for Québec this translates into $162 million in additional
transfers.
The results for the metrics measured in percentages are not economically
unimportant, either. For Québec, for example, one more MP for the party in power (a
1.3% increase) generates an extra $0.51 in per capita transfers, or a total of around
$3miiiion. Remember that Québec has 75 ridings, and at the Bloc Québécois holds
around 50 ofthese.
No political variable capturing the “constituent” effect is significant when the
dependent is the entire transfer system. This is true whether or flot Alberta is included.
Some sensitivity analysis was performed for “other” transfers within the
“constituents” framework. When “other” transfers are the dependent and Alberta is
excluded ail politicai variables are insignficant. This weakens the evidence for the
“constituents” model. The Alberta exclusion restriction is the only one that makes all
the politicai variables insignificant. In other words if T exclude any province other than
Aiberta the politicai variables capturing the “constituents” effect still remain at least
somewhat significant (by somewhat I mean that at least one of the three initially
significant variables remains significant). Clearly the results hinge on the Alberta
exclusion restriction.
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Overall, resuits here suggest that parties in power do transfer monies to
constituents, although the sensitivity of the resuits to the exclusion of Alberta does
mitigate support for this model. If the reader supports the hypothesis that Alberta is the
area of Canada where transfers offer the Iowest marginal political payoff, then its
exclusion from the analyses should unveil the federal government’s relationship with
the other, more persuadable, provinces. In other words the electoral incentives should
become clearer. On the other hand, one could argue this resuit highiights the long-term
cost of Alberta’s support for any party that is flot the Liberal party; opposing the party
that has dorninated Canadian federai politics for 75 years is certainly flot a
moneymaking strategy.
As with “swing” transfers, constituency driven transfers are from the “other”
category, not from the two main transfer categories.
Table 15: Results of the iterative substitution of political variables, partisan
analysis
Partisan analysis
“Other” transfersAil transfers
Vote Lib ns ns
shares NDP ns ns
Percentage Lib_seats ns ns
of seats NDP_seats ns
***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10%
level; ns: not significant
Note: GL$ estimator used, correcting for AR(l) type serial correlation and for
heteroscedastic panels. Controls inciude reai per capita provincial own source
revenues, the unemployment rate, the naturai logarithm of the population, and a full set
of year dummies.
Note: Alberta aiways removed when ail transfers are considered
Here, the evidence of partisan rewards is extremely limited.
However, when the dependent is ail transfers and Alberta is included, the
coefficient on the Liberal vote share becomes significant at the 5% level and is $5.50.
This implies that every percentage increase of the popular vote accorded to the Liberai
party is rewarded by an increase of $5.50 in per capita transfers. The reader should
$3
consider this resuit carefully, as the Liberal vote is highly negatively correlated with the
measure of fiscal capacity. It was shown that the estimated slope for the fiscal capacity
function is biased upwards in the presence of Alberta. The Liberal vote share variable
as an independent may compensate for this bias, since this measure is strongly
negatively correlated with the fiscal capacity variable that is underestimated. The fact
that the Liberal vote share is significant and positive supports this interpretation.
Table 16: Results ofthe iterative substitution ofpolitical variables, over-representation:
Over-representation
Ail transfers “Other” transfers
Seats per
capita ns ns
***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10%
level; ns: not significant
Note: GLS estimator used, correcting for AR(1) type serial correlation and for
heteroscedastic panels. Controls include real per capita provincial own source
revenues, the unemployment rate, the natural logarithm ofthe population, and a full set
ofyear dummies.
Note: Alberta always removed when all transfers are considered
I find no support for the idea that provinces with higher per capita representation
receive more transfers controlling for the log population, at least on the macroscopic
level.
Discussion of resuits
The evidence that transfers are used to purchase votes strategically in “swing”
regions is not convincing. Variables capturing this model were modified in many ways,
to capture the electoral cycle for example, but only two related metrics turned out to be
significant and ofthe expected sign, and many coefficients were negative (see
Appendix 4). If anything, the benefits ofbeing a “swing region” are felt after the
conclusion of the election, flot before.
Second, there is some mixed evidence that supports the “constituents” model,
although results are extrernely sensitive to excluding Alberta. Because excluding
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Alberta renders ail political variables insignificant, we cannot say the resuits support
strongly the “constituents” model. That being said, it is the most significant resuit
found here.
Third, it does flot appear that voting for the Liberal party generates higher
transfers (or that voting Conservative lowers them). Close examination of results in
Appendix 4 reveal that although the NDP coefficients are statistically insignificant they
are ail negative. This lends support to the results of the “constituents” model as the
NDP neyer formed the government in the period under study.
Fourth, and finally, I find little evidence that over-representation significantly
contributes to increasing transfers, ail else being equal. This contradicts Evans (2005),
although this thesis differs from his paper in two respects. He looks at spending and
taxation, not transfers. His level of observation is the electoral district, not the province.
In Canada only Prince Edward Island (PET) exhibits political over-representation
on a provincial level. The following scatter-plot shows transfers per capita transfers as
a function of the number of elected MPs per 100,000 inhabitants. The outliers at the top
right are Prince Edward Island.
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Figure XI: Real per capita transfers plotted against the number of MPs per
100,000 inhabitants
o
O.
O
O
O.
O
e e • e
•
e €PEI
ç •••• .
•s
aj O
• e.
O s
0
I I I I I I
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Number cf elected representatives per 1 00,000 inhabitants
Although there seems to be a positive relationship, we saw above that
controlling for population and other normative factors makes over-representation
insignificant.
Overail, the transfers that were most sensitive to political influence were “other
transfers”. The main transfers are set by formulas and are hard to openly manipulate.
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5. CONCLUSION
I presented several competing models of political behaviour and went on at some length
about correctly modeling national fiscal and political institutions. I hope to have
demonstrated that simply applying the Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) approach to
the entire transfer system without showing deference to actual mechanisms may flot be
the best approach. Their model’s simple functional form is an excellent starting point,
though.
Econometric estimation supported the expected functional forms for the two
main transfer categories. Equalization transfers regressed on fiscal capacity and year
dummies generated an R-Square of 0.70 and a slope of -0.80. Healthcare and social
transfers regressed on the three normative controls produces a much smaller R-Square
of 0.17. On the other hand, when regressing healthcare and social transfers on only year
dummies, the R-Square jumps to 0.75. We can be fairly satisfied that the main
components ofthe transfer system were controlled for. Careful analysis also permitted
me to remove Equalization and healthcare transfers from potential political influence,
allowing me to take a doser look at “other” transfers.
Great care was taken when constructing the econometric model. Including too
many macroeconomic variables as controls introduced multicollinearity. I presented
scatter-plots justifying the linearity assumptions, something empirical papers should do
more when relying upon linear estimators. Paying great attention to this type of
specification mistake should take precedence over the modeling of standard errors.
I also came out against the use of the provincial/state fixed effects when using a
yearly panel. Provincial fixed effects removed any cross-sectional variation in the data.
On the other hand, I suggested that using year fixed effects made good sense.
The year fixed effects can capture shifts in the federal government’ s per capita budget
constraint, as well as capturing the flat per capita healthcare transfer.
The fact the transfers in Canada can be modeled with a single equation, as
opposed to a system of two equations, is not a trivial result either. In fact, testing the
$7
endogeneity of grants should be the first step when modeling a country’s transfer
mechanisms.
It is possible to generate R-Square of 0.20 with only three variables and without
year or province dummies. This is quite good and supports the Boex and Martinex
Vazquez (2004) linear model. Although models derived from theory or first principles
may be more desirable to some, the robustness of their empirical model leaves no doubt.
I hope the reader is convinced of the empirical value of their model.
Overall, the transfer system is equalizing: the coefficient for fiscal capacity is -
0.15 (standard error = 0.05). A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
increases per capita transfers by $35 (standard error = 12). A one percent increase in
population decreases per capita transfers by $3.85 (standard error = 0.4).
The main political result concerns the “constituents” effect. Three of the four
metrics capturing the “constituents” effect were positive, and statistically and
economically significant when the dependent was “other” transfers.
The following can be used to complete the comparative analysis of the Boex and
Martinez-Vazquez (2004) paper.
Table 17: Comparative resuits for Canada
Expenditure Fiscal Political power Population R2
needs capacity size
Canada Unemployment: + Revenue: - Political support: + Population: - 0.86
GDP: -
Future research should further breakdown the transfer system. Healthcare and
social transfers should be separated. In doing this the health and the social parts ofthe
Canadian Health and Social Transfer need to be distinguished. Future research also
needs to take a doser look at not only “other” transfers as defined here, but the category
“Miscellaneous current transfers”. 1n2001, these totaled more than $4 billion, a
substantial absolute amount. What lurks in here may the most susceptible to political
manipulation, since the government bas chosen to aggregate transfers into this category
as opposed to reporting its components as line items.
8$
More specifically, future research should apply the core mode! to the following:
- Canadian Health and Social Transfer,
Social transfers: social portion
- Canada Assistance Plan
- Postsecondary education grants
- Canadian Health and Social Transfer,
Health transfers: health portion
- Health Resources Fund
- Medicare
- Contributions under the Hospital
Insurance Act
Equalization:
- Taxation agreements (Equalization)
Each ofthe following taken separately:
- Miscellaneous current transfers
- Regional economic expansion payments
- Officiai languages
- Contributions under the Crop Insurance
Act
- Transfers to provincial universities
- Statutory grants
More rigorous treatment of some of Canada’s smaller transfers can be afforded
in this way. Take the case ofthe OfficiaI Languages Act that finances minority
language education. I suggested that minority language education was a ment good.
Given this, one can append the three variable model described above with a variable
that measures the percentage of the provincial population that was in a minority
language position. The expected sign of this variable’s coefficient is positive.
The fact that real per capita transfers are a piece-wise linear function, with
Alberta occupying the horizontal arm, should at the very least provoke some normative
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discussions. Alberta on its own basically messes up the nice linear equalizing aspect of
the transfer system by a factor of about 50%. Transfers to Alberta were on average
$800 per person during the period, while for the rest of Canada (excluding Alberta) the
unweighted average was $1700. In other words, one could say that in order to maintain
the current linear equalization aspect of the transfer system, Alberta should receive
signfficantly fewer transfers than it does 110W.
The outlying Alberta observations, however, were from the start and the end of
the period of observation. During these years the price of ou was relatively high.
Modeling Alberta’ s fiscal capacity and attempting to net out the effect of ou prices
could improve the national model.
There may also be efficiency gains to be had by modeling the clustered nature of
the population variable.
Yet I controlled for over 80% ofthe transfer system.
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APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATED VALUE 0F TUE QUÉBEC ABATEMENT
The following table shows the estirnated per capita value in both nominal and real terms
ofthe 13.5% healthcare tax point transfer ofthe basic federal personal incorne.
Table A 1: Value ofthe 13.5% Québec personal income tax abatement for healthcare
on a per capita basis, 19$ 1-2001
Value of abatement, per Value of abatement, per
Year capita, nominal dollars capita, 1992 real dollars
1981 109 196
1982 117 189
1983 122 181
1984 130 183
1985 146 199
1986 175 228
1987 192 241
1988 204 245
1989 219 253
1990 255 279
1991 258 264
1992 261 263
1993 248 245
1994 249 243
1995 267 259
1996 280 267
1997 296 276
1998 318 294
1999 320 294
2000 360 323
2001 370 322
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada data.
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APPENifiX 3: TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION
Endogeneity of per capita income and per capita tax revenues (fiscal capacity) was
detected using a (linear) simplification of the Hausman specification test30. Suppose the
following regression model, where we suspect y2 of being an endogenous regressor:
yi = to + 131Y2 + f32xi + + u
Regress the suspect variable on all other exogenous variables (and any other
instruments you may have if performing an IV estimation):
Y2 = 0 + JTIXJ + ru2X2 + e
We can obtain the fitted values of e, ê, and put them back into the original
equation model, such that,
yi = 3o + f3IY2 + f32x1 + + a0ê + u
This procedure basically splits the error term in two parts: one is correlated with
the independent variable, and the other is uncorreiated with the independent variable.
Sometimes it is said that this procedure “purges” the (true) error term (u) of its
correlation with the independent variable.
Under the nulI hypothesis of this test — that the error term is uncorrelated with
the independent variable or that OLS is unbiased - the coefficient on the fitted residual,
a0, should be zero. ê is the part of the error term that is correiated with y2. One can use
OLS (with robust standard errors) to obtain a t-statistic on a0 to test the nuli.
Using this method, both per capita income and per capita tax revenues were
found to be endogenous. These two measures are linearly related and can be viewed as
proxies for one another, so it is not surprising that the endogeneity of one implies the
endogeneity of the other.
So, the use of a 2SL$ estimation method is well motivated, since it is a known
fact that correlation between an explanatoiy variable and the error term causes bias in
OLS estimates.
What’s more, this model was run with real per capita provincial government
spending, and this variable was found to be endogenous.
Wallis (1996) posits that bias occurs because per capita spending and per capita
grants are simultaneous determined. It was empirically verified that per capita fiscal
capacity measures and per capita income are correlated with the error term, which is
what he predicts. Thus proposing a second stage where real own revenues per capita
are endogenously determined makes sense, since this is the variable that is correlated
with the error term. Thus two alternative estimation models are proposed. Ail fiscal
variables are in real and per capita terms.
30 See Wooldridge (2002)
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Wailis’s original, where SPEND, provincial government spending (with own
revenues also explaining expenditures in the second stage):
(A3-1) FG1,,
= 13o + I31SPEND,,, + f32rnvn revenues1,, + 33unemploymeflt,,, +
f341n(poputation,,,) + Zyear, +
(A3-1’) SPEND1,, a0+ a1FG1, + a2own revenues1,1 + a3unempÏoymentl,, + a4oÏd, +
a5young1,, +
Two alternative specifications of a second mode! will also be estimated:
(A3-2) FG1,,
= 3o + f3iown revenues1,, + j32unernpÏoymentl,, + j331n(populationl,,) + Zyear,
+ Ej,t
(A3-2’) own revenues1,,, = ao + ajunernployment1,, + a2old1, + a3young,,, +
(A3-3) fG1,,
= Io + 3iown revenues1,, + l32unernploymentl,, + j331n(population1,,) + Zyear,
+
(A3-3’) own revenuesj,,t ao + Pprovince, + ajunemployment1,, + a2old1,, + a3young,,, +
ui,t
In these models FG are real per capita federal grants; $PEND is reai per capita
provincial government spending; own revenues are real per capita provincial own
revenues; unemployment is the unemployment rate (0<x<1 00); and ln(population) is the
natural logarithm of the population. Z is a vector of coefficients applied to the set of
year dummies, year. Old and young are the proportion of the elderly and the young in
the population. f inally P is a vector of coefficients applied to the set of provincial
dummies, province.
The first set of equations is proposed by Wallis (1996) to correct for
simultaneity bias induced by a matching grant system.
The two subsequent 2$LS models I propose (A3-2; A3-3) are actually
instrumental variable regressions. $ince per capita own revenues were found to be
endogenous, it is only natural to want to instrument this variable. I suggested, to add, in
the section above that provincial government spending per capita was not found to be
endogenous.
In (A3-2), real per capita provincial own revenues are a linear function of
demographic factors. I do not include real per capita GDP because3’ this is highly
collinear with the demographic variables, and a reversa! of results occurs. Regardless, I
have already estimated that real per capita own revenues are a positive linear function of
per capita GDP and that the slope is around 0.15, which is what you would see if this
specification were presented here.
In (A3-3), real per capita own revenues are simply a function of a set of
provincial dummies. This is meant to capture the fact that differences in provincial
31 The results presents in columns (14) and (15) are robust to alternative specifications
as long as ail demographic variables and per capita GDP are not included in the same
regression (as was discussed before).
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revenues are persistent and may be due to local (invariant) fixed effects, such as natural
endowments or proximity to export markets.
A common error in constructing simultaneous equation models is that the two
equations represent the behaviour of the same agent, “so neither equation can stand on
its own” (Wooldridge 2003, page 529). It is important to describe the behaviour of the
federal government in the fist eguation and the “behaviour” of provincial governments
in the second.
One wouïd like to include another fiscal variable in the system’ s first equation
that describes the federal government’s willingness to distribute grants, for example
budget surpluses. This would involve more data than is necessary, since we will
eventually discard the 2SL$ estimator. For the purposes of this study we will restrict
ourselves to using year dummies which should capture any shifi in the government’ s
(per capita) budget constraint.
It is also important to identify the first equation with an exogenous variable that
is included in the second equation but not in the first. These variables will be the
proportion of young and the elderly in the population. Although some could argue that
this is an important variable in federal behaviour, one could argue that it is more
important for local governments, since they provide for education and healthcare.
Empirically one can find a negative linear relation between federal grants and the
proportion of youngsters, but this relationship is due to the fact the per capita income
and the proportion of youngsters is also strongly linear and negative. Furthermore, the
federal government intervenes only at the post-secondary level and health-care grants
are approximately distributed on a flat per capita basis. This suggests the actual
proportion of old people in any given province is of no concern to the federal
government.
We will find that the 2$LS estimates from the systems above are the sensibly the
same as those in the OLS estimates.
My OLS model does not suffer from simultaneity bias — as suggested by the fact
that 2$LS and OL$ estimates are sensibly the same32. I can proceed with confidence
with the OLS estimations.
Table A3 below presents the results.
32 Wooldridge (2003) and Islam and Choudhury (1990) both suggest this approach to
verifying expost whether a 2$L$ was necessary.
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Table A 3: 2SLS regression resuits of the “core” economic model
Real per capita transfers
(A3-1) (A3-2) (A3-3)
Real per capita
spending 0.13
(0.27)
Real per capita
own revenues -0.24 -0.052 -0.27
(0.11 )** (0.052)*** (0.034)***
Unemployment 72.15 96.5 70.47
(18.6)*** (9.12)*** (7.63)***
z
In(population) -284.28 -327.7 -281.7
(32.7)*** (20.4)*** (19.2)***
Constant 5118.13 5451.155 5907.07
(125 1.97)*** (315.30)*** (305.7)***
Pseudo R-squared 0.89 0.84 0.85
Note Year FE Year FE Year FE
Real per capita Real per capita own revenues
provincial goy. spending
Real per capita
transfers 0.46
(0.083 )* * *
Real per capita
own revenues 0.56
(0.042)***
Unemployment 39.7 -176.29 -189.42
(15.29)*** (13.6)*** (11.5)***
Old prop. 37.9 -205.9 -128.55
(24.0) (32.5)*** (27.2)**
ç_?
Cl Youngprop -12.3 -126.1 -191.7
(14.4) 1 (20.8)”’ (27.2)***
Constant 2179.52 11581.4 13356.1
(70$.3)*** (814.6)*** (1213.4)***
Pseudo R-squared 0.55 0.50 0.78
No. obs. 210 210 210
Note Province FE
100
Note: First stage aiways includes year dummies, coefficients flot shown.
***: significant at the 1% level
* *: significant at the 5% level
*: significant at the 10% level
The Wallis (1996) specification is not applicable to the Canadian case. Yet
any researcher examining a system where matching grants are widely used should
take care to verify robustness of resuits.
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APPENDIX 4: COMPLETE RESULTS 0F THE ITERATIVE PROCEDURE
The following are the resuits ofthe iterative procedure. The total number of tables for
each of the models is presented at the end of each table’s titie, in parantheses (#/#).
D
D
10
2
T
ab
le
A
4-
1:
R
es
ui
ts
o
fp
ol
iti
ca
l e
st
im
at
io
n,
“
sw
in
g”
m
o
de
l,
1/
4
R
ea
lp
er
c
a
pi
ta
tr
an
sf
er
s
D
um
m
y
v
a
ri
ab
le
s
sw
in
g2
sw
in
g5
fs
w
in
g2
fs
w
in
g5
bs
w
in
g2
bs
w
in
g5
R
ea
l
pe
r
c
a
pi
ta
pr
ov
in
ci
al
o
w
n
re
v
e
n
u
e
s
-
0.
16
-
0.
16
-
0.
16
-
0.
16
-
0.
16
-
0.
16
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0
.05
3)
**
*
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0
.05
3)
**
*
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0.
05
4)*
**
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
36
.0
37
.4
37
.9
39
.1
36
.3
35
.4
(12
.0)
**
*
(12
.2)
**
*
(11
.9)
**
*
(1
2.0
)*
**
(12
.1)
**
*
(1
2.l
)*
**
ln
(P
op
ul
ati
on
)
-
38
3
-
38
2
-
38
4
-
37
9
-
38
3
-
38
4
(3
97
)*
**
(40
.6)
**
*
(39
.0)
**
*
(3
$5
)*
**
(40
.7)
**
*
(4
12
)*
**
Po
lit
ic
al
v
a
ria
bl
e
sw
in
g2
sw
in
g5
fs
w
in
g2
fs
w
in
g5
bs
w
in
g2
bs
w
in
g5
-
$4
.2
-
27
.7
21
.8
-
5.
53
-
17
.1
-
11
.1
(46
.2)
*
(33
.4)
(43
.8)
(29
.6)
(60
.8)
(34
.7)
C
on
st
an
t (
19
81
)
72
02
71
60
71
72
70
84
71
61
71
85
(61
0)*
**
(61
7)*
**
(62
0)*
**
(5
89
)*
**
(60
6)*
*
(61
7)*
**
R
es
tr
ic
tio
n
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
L
og
-li
ke
lih
oo
d
-
11
72
-
11
73
-
11
75
-
11
75
-
11
73
-
11
73
N
o.
o
bs
.
18
9
18
9
18
9
18
9
18
9
18
9
M
et
ho
d
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
A
R
(0
.$4
),
A
R
(0
.84
),
A
R
(0
.83
),
A
R
(0
.82
),
A
R
(0
.84
),
A
R
(0
.84
),
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l;
*
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l;
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l
J Ta
bl
e
A
4-
2:
R
es
ul
ts
o
fp
ol
îti
ca
l e
st
im
at
io
n,
“
sw
in
g”
m
o
de
l,
2/
4
R
ea
lp
er
c
a
pi
ta
tr
an
sf
er
s
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
o
fr
id
in
gs
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g2
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g5
rid
in
g_
fs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
fs
w
in
g5
rid
ïn
g_
bs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
bs
w
in
g5
R
ea
l
pe
r
c
a
pi
ta
pr
ov
in
ci
al
o
w
n
re
v
e
n
u
e
s
-
0.
15
-
0.
15
-
0.
15
-
0.
15
-
0.
17
-
0.
15
(0
.05
3)
**
*
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0.
05
3)*
**
(0.
05
4)*
**
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
36
.2
35
.0
34
.3
38
.2
32
.7
34
.7
(12
.2)
**
*
(12
.2)
**
*
(12
.2)
**
*
(1
2.l
)*
**
(12
.2)
**
*
(12
,3)
**
*
ln
(P
op
ul
ati
on
)
-
38
5
-
38
6
-
39
1
-
38
0
-
38
2
-
38
6
(41
.9)
**
*
(42
.1)
**
*
(42
.3)
**
*
(40
.0)
**
*
(41
,5)
**
*
(42
.3)
**
*
Po
lit
ic
al
v
a
ria
bl
e
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g2
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g5
rid
in
g_
fs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
Fs
w
in
g5
rid
in
g_
bs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
bs
w
in
g5
-
19
9
-
12
.9
-
23
3
57
.4
-
23
3
5.
65
(18
1)
(79
.5)
(16
7)
(79
.0)
(17
1)
(90
.6)
C
on
st
an
t (
19
81
)
72
05
72
12
73
12
70
76
72
21
72
05
(61
0)*
**
(61
7)*
**
(62
0)*
**
(5$
9)*
**
(60
6)*
*
(61
7)*
**
R
es
tr
ic
tio
n
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
A
lb
er
ta
re
m
o
v
ed
Lo
g-
Iik
el
ïh
oo
d
-
11
72
-
11
72
-
11
72
-
11
73
-
11
72
-
11
73
N
o.
o
bs
.
18
9
18
9
18
9
18
9
18
9
18
9
M
et
ho
d
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
A
R
(0
.84
),
A
R
(0
.85
),
A
R
(0.
85
),
A
R
(0
.83
),
A
R
(0
.84
),
A
R
(0
.85
),
lie
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
lie
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l;
*
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l;
*
*
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l
D
D
D
T
ab
le
A
4-
3:
R
es
ui
ts
o
fp
ol
iti
ca
le
st
im
at
io
n,
“
sw
in
g”
m
o
de
l,
3/
4 R
ea
lp
er
c
a
pi
ta
“
o
th
er
”
tr
an
sf
er
s
D
um
m
y
v
a
ri
ab
le
s
sw
in
g2
sw
in
g5
fs
w
in
g2
fs
w
in
g5
bs
w
in
g2
bs
w
in
g5
R
ea
l
pe
r
c
a
pi
ta
pr
ov
in
ci
al
o
w
n
re
v
e
n
u
e
s
-
0.
00
69
-
0.
00
7$
-
0.
00
63
-
0.
00
74
-
0.
00
65
-
0.
00
69
(0.
00
74
)
(0
.00
76
)
(0
.00
72
)
(0
.00
7$
)
(0.
00
73
)
(0.
00
76
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-
0.
18
6
-
0.
33
0
-
0.
03
7
-
0.
62
-
0.
30
-
0.
51
(7.
39
)
(3.
33
)
(3.
30
)
(3.
52
)
(3.
20
)
(3.
34
)
ln
(P
op
ul
ati
on
)
-
48
.1
-
48
.9
-
50
.1
-
49
.8
-
49
.2
-
48
.6
(7.
3$
)**
*
(7.
5)*
**
(7.
6$
)**
*
(7.
$$
)**
*
(7.
23
)**
*
(7.
46
)**
*
Fo
lit
ic
al
v
a
ria
bl
e
sw
in
g2
Sw
in
g5
fs
w
in
g2
fs
w
in
g5
fs
w
in
g2
bs
w
in
g5
-
11
.7
-
13
.4
14
.2
7.
77
16
.6
4.
04
(21
.6)
(15
.8)
(23
.5)
(16
.3)
(25
.9)
(17
.9)
C
on
st
an
t (
19
81
)
87
8
89
8
90
0
90
7
89
1
88
7.
8
(11
9)*
**
(12
8)*
**
(12
5)*
**
(13
2)*
**
(11
9)*
**
(12
2)*
**
R
es
tr
ic
tio
n
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
L
og
-li
ke
lih
oo
d
-
11
63
-
11
62
-
11
64
-
11
65
-
11
62
-
11
62
N
o.
o
bs
.
21
0
21
0
21
0
21
0
21
0
21
0
M
et
ho
d
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
A
R
(0
.47
),
A
R
(0
.49
),
A
R
(0
.48
),
A
R
(0
.50
),
A
R
(0
.47
),
A
R
(0
.49
),
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
*
:
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t
a
t
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l;
*
*
:
si
gn
if
ic
an
t
a
t
th
e
5%
le
ve
l;
*
*
*
:
si
gn
if
ic
an
ta
t
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l
D
D
T
ab
le
A
4-
4:
R
es
ul
ts
o
fp
ol
it
ic
al
e
s
tim
at
io
n,
“
sw
in
g”
m
o
de
l,
4/
4
R
ea
lp
er
c
a
pi
ta
“
o
th
er
”
tr
an
sf
er
s
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
o
fr
id
in
gs
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g2
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g5
rid
in
g_
fs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
fs
w
in
g5
rï
di
ng
_b
sw
in
g2
rid
in
g_
bs
w
in
g5
R
ea
l
pe
r
c
a
pi
ta
pr
ov
in
ci
al
o
w
n
re
v
e
n
u
e
s
-
0.
00
67
-
0.
00
68
-
0.
00
33
-
0.
00
10
-
0.
00
61
-
0.
00
57
(0
.00
79
)
(0
.00
74
)
(0
.00
71
)
(0
.00
72
)
(0.
00
74
)
(0.
00
74
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-
0.
10
-
0.
06
6
0.
99
0.
98
-
0.
02
9
-
0.
13
(3.
22
)
(3.
11
)
(3.
17
)
(3.
12
)
(3.
26
)
(3.
23
)
ln
(P
op
ul
ati
on
)
-
48
.9
-
48
.5
-
48
.1
-
45
.9
-
48
.1
-
47
.7
(7
.19
)*
**
(6.
89
)**
*
(7
.26
)*
**
(7.
05
)**
*
(7.
23
)**
*
(7.
25
)**
*
Fo
lit
ic
al
v
a
ria
bl
e
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g2
rid
in
g_
sw
in
g5
rid
in
g_
fs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
fs
w
ïn
g5
rid
in
g_
bs
w
in
g2
rid
in
g_
bs
w
in
g5
-
0.
18
-
0.
14
1.
59
1.
10
0.
55
0.
45
(0.
91
7)
(0.
45
6)
(0.
87
)*
(0.
45
)**
(1.
02
)
(0.
51
)
C
on
st
an
t(
19
81
)
89
0
88
3
83
8
79
3
87
3
86
6
(1
18
)*
**
(11
6)*
**
(12
0)*
**
(11
9)*
**
(12
0)*
**
(12
0)*
**
R
es
tr
ic
tio
n
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
N
on
e
L
og
-li
ke
lih
oo
d
-
11
64
-
11
62
-
11
61
-
11
58
-
16
2
-
11
61
N
o.
o
bs
.
21
0
21
0
21
0
21
0
21
0
21
0
M
et
ho
d
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
r F
E,
G
LS
, Y
ea
rF
E,
G
LS
,Y
ea
rF
E,
A
R
(0
.46
),
A
R
(0
.44
),
A
R
(0
.47
),
A
R
(0
.47
),
A
R
(0
.47
),
A
R
(0
.47
),
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
pa
ne
ls
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l;
*
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l;
*
*
*
:
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l
D
D
D
